Results 201 to 210 of about 189,244 (238)
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Two Varieties of Epistemic Luck
2005AbstractI examine two species of epistemic luck that I claim are not benign and explain how they feature in the main epistemological debates. The first species of epistemic luck—what I call ‘veritic’ luck—can be handled with a modest ‘relevant alternatives’ account of knowledge that is specifically defined so that it counters this type of epistemic ...
Duncan Pritchard
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Synthese, 2006
There is some consensus that for S to know that p, it cannot be merely a matter of luck that S’s belief that p is true. This consideration has led Duncan Pritchard and others to propose a safety condition on knowledge. In this paper, we argue that the safety condition is not a proper formulation of the intuition that knowledge excludes luck. We suggest
Avram Hiller, Ram Neta
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There is some consensus that for S to know that p, it cannot be merely a matter of luck that S’s belief that p is true. This consideration has led Duncan Pritchard and others to propose a safety condition on knowledge. In this paper, we argue that the safety condition is not a proper formulation of the intuition that knowledge excludes luck. We suggest
Avram Hiller, Ram Neta
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Anti-Luck Virtue Epistemology and Epistemic Defeat [PDF]
SynthÈse, 2018 This paper explores how a certain theory of knowledge—known as anti-luck virtue epistemology—can account for, and in the process shed light on, the notion of an epistemic defeater.
Duncan Pritchard
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Epistemic Luck and Epistemic Risk
Erkenntnis, 2021We are witnessing a certain tendency in epistemology to account for the anti-luck intuition in terms of risk. I.e., instead of the traditional anti-luck diagnosis of Gettier cases and fake barn cases, a new anti-risk diagnosis seems to be preferable by many.
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The Problem of Moral Luck: An Argument Against Its Epistemic Reduction [PDF]
Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, 2009 Whom I call 'epistemic reductionists' in this article are critics of the notion of 'moral luck' that maintain that all supposed cases of moral luck are illusory; they are in fact cases of what I describe as a special form of epistemic luck, the only ...
Anders Schinkel
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Synthese, 2009
Although many philosophers have argued that an event is lucky for an agent only if it was suitably improbable, there is considerable disagreement about how to understand this improbability condition. This paper argues for a hitherto overlooked construal of the improbability condition in terms of the lucky agent’s epistemic situation.
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Although many philosophers have argued that an event is lucky for an agent only if it was suitably improbable, there is considerable disagreement about how to understand this improbability condition. This paper argues for a hitherto overlooked construal of the improbability condition in terms of the lucky agent’s epistemic situation.
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Ancient Philosophy, 2022
The Stoics held that knowledge depends on the special kind of true appearances they called ‘apprehensive.’ Sextus Empiricus reports that they also thought that some true appearances are not apprehensive—and hence unable to lead to knowledge—because they are true merely ‘externally and by chance’, which suggests that the Stoics were aware of the problem
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The Stoics held that knowledge depends on the special kind of true appearances they called ‘apprehensive.’ Sextus Empiricus reports that they also thought that some true appearances are not apprehensive—and hence unable to lead to knowledge—because they are true merely ‘externally and by chance’, which suggests that the Stoics were aware of the problem
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The Southern Journal of Philosophy, 1994
L'A. remet en question la these de M. Engel, i.e. la connaissance serait en definitive qu'une question de chance, these developpee dans son article « Is Epistemic Luck Compatible with Knowledge » (1992)
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L'A. remet en question la these de M. Engel, i.e. la connaissance serait en definitive qu'une question de chance, these developpee dans son article « Is Epistemic Luck Compatible with Knowledge » (1992)
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Philosophical Studies, 2011
Kelly Becker has argued that in an externalist anti-luck epistemology, we must hold that knowledge requires the satisfaction of both a modalized tracking condition and a process reliability condition. We raise various problems for the examples that are supposed to establish this claim.
Anthony Brueckner, Christopher T. Buford
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Kelly Becker has argued that in an externalist anti-luck epistemology, we must hold that knowledge requires the satisfaction of both a modalized tracking condition and a process reliability condition. We raise various problems for the examples that are supposed to establish this claim.
Anthony Brueckner, Christopher T. Buford
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THE EPISTEMIC ANALYSIS OF LUCK
Episteme, 2015AbstractDuncan Pritchard has argued that luck is fundamentally a modal notion: an event is lucky when it occurs in the actual world, but does not occur in more than half of the relevant nearby possible worlds. Jennifer Lackey has provided counterexamples to accounts which, like Pritchard's, only allow for the existence of improbable lucky events.
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