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Epistemic Responsibility and Relativism
2020A person can assert “I know that p” in an epistemically responsible or irresponsible way. Epistemic responsibility relativism is the view that the act of making a knowledge claim is epistemically responsible or irresponsible only relative to an audience and its system of epistemic standards, and that there is no neutral way of ranking different ...
Rolin Kristina, Rolin Kristina
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2018
Broadly speaking, relativism is the view that, at least in some domains, everything or every truth is relative to some standards so that, when two or more people disagree about these issues, they may all be correct (Siegel 2011; Boghossian 2006; Baghramian and Carter 2016).
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Broadly speaking, relativism is the view that, at least in some domains, everything or every truth is relative to some standards so that, when two or more people disagree about these issues, they may all be correct (Siegel 2011; Boghossian 2006; Baghramian and Carter 2016).
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Relativism and stations of epistemic doubt
Journal of Experimental Child Psychology, 1990This sequence of studies examined the role that relativistic thinking plays in the cognitive and social-emotional lives of adolescents. Study 1 introduces an assessment strategy and associated descriptive model employed in evaluating how 70 concrete and formal operational adolescents differently interpret and resolve problems involving competing ...
M, Chandler, M, Boyes, L, Ball
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Indeterminism and Epistemic Relativization
Philosophy of Science, 1977Carl G. Hempel's doctrine of essential epistemic relativization of inductive-statistical explanation seems to entail the unintelligibility of the notion of objective homogeneity of reference classes. This discussion note explores the question of whether, as a consequence, essential epistemic relativization also entails the unintelligibility of the ...
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Acta Analytica, 2008
It is generally assumed that there are (at least) two fundamental epistemic goals: believing truths, and avoiding the acceptance of falsehoods. As has been often noted, these goals are in conflict with one another. Moreover, the norms governing rational belief that we should derive from these two goals depend on how we weight them relative to one ...
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It is generally assumed that there are (at least) two fundamental epistemic goals: believing truths, and avoiding the acceptance of falsehoods. As has been often noted, these goals are in conflict with one another. Moreover, the norms governing rational belief that we should derive from these two goals depend on how we weight them relative to one ...
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On Certainty, Epistemic Incommensurability and Epistemic Relativism
Wittgenstein-Studien, 2018Abstract:In this paper, I present Wittgenstein’s remarks on the structure of reason, drawing on the notions of “hinges” he developed in On Certainty. I then outline some of the unpalatable relativistic consequences that can be extracted by Wittgenstein’s epistemological views.
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Epistemic Replacement Relativism Defended
2009In this paper I shall offer a response to Paul Boghossian’s recent criticism of “replacement relativism”. Replacement relativism is the main semantic strategy for making sense of philosophical forms of relativism. Replacement relativism was first formulated by Gilbert Harman (1996a, b).
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Moderate Epistemic Relativism and Our Epistemic Goals
Episteme, 2007ABSTRACTAlthough radical forms of relativism are perhaps beyond the epistemological pale, I argue here that a more moderate form may be plausible, and articulate the conditions under which moderate epistemic relativism could well serve our epistemic goals.
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In Defense of Epistemic Relativism
Episteme, 2007ABSTRACTIn Fear of Knowledge, Paul Boghossian argues against various forms of epistemic relativism. In this paper, I criticize Boghossian’s arguments against a particular variety of relativism. I then argue in favor of a thesis that is very similar to this variety of relativism.
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