Results 251 to 260 of about 5,575,022 (286)
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Infertility, epistemic risk, and disease definitions
SynthÈse, 2017I explore the role that values and interests, especially ideological interests, play in managing and balancing epistemic risks in medicine. I will focus in particular on how diseases are identified and operationalized. Before we can do biomedical research on a condition, it needs to be identified as a medical condition, and it needs to be ...
Quill R Kukla
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Epistemic Risk and Picking Priors II
2022AbstractIn previous chapters, I argued that, when we pick our priors, we should do so using (i) strictly proper epistemic utility functions to measure the epistemic value of a credal state, and (ii) a decision rule from the family of risk-sensitive decision rules called the Generalised Hurwicz Criterion.
Richard Pettigrew
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The Geography of Epistemic Risk
2017At each stage of inquiry, actions, choices, and judgments carry with them a chance that they will lead to mistakes and false conclusions. One of the most vigorously discussed kinds of epistemic risk is inductive risk—that is, the risk of inferring a false positive or a false negative from statistical evidence.
Justin B. Biddle, Rebecca Kukla
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The Epistemic Risk in Representation
Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal, 2022Both the distinction between the 'internal' and 'external' phases of science and the concept of 'inductive risk' are core constructs in the values in science literature. However, both constructs have shortcomings, which, we argue, have concealed the unique significance of values in scientific representation. We defend three closely-related proposals to
Stephanie, Harvard, Eric, Winsberg
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Epistemic Luck and Epistemic Risk
Erkenntnis, 2021We are witnessing a certain tendency in epistemology to account for the anti-luck intuition in terms of risk. I.e., instead of the traditional anti-luck diagnosis of Gettier cases and fake barn cases, a new anti-risk diagnosis seems to be preferable by many.
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Epistemic Risk and Epistemic Utility for Credences
2022AbstractIn this chapter, I note Sophie Horowitz’s (2017) observation that a credal version of Kelly’s Jamesian argument from the previous chapter will not deliver permissivism in the credal case. This is because, in that case, it is generally agreed that all legitimate measures of epistemic utility must have a particular property—in the jargon, they ...
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Philosophy of Science, 2019
I propose a general alethic theory of epistemic risk according to which the riskiness of an agent’s credence function encodes her relative sensitivity to different types of graded error. After motivating and mathematically developing this approach, I show that the epistemic risk function is a scaled reflection of expected inaccuracy (a quantity also ...
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I propose a general alethic theory of epistemic risk according to which the riskiness of an agent’s credence function encodes her relative sensitivity to different types of graded error. After motivating and mathematically developing this approach, I show that the epistemic risk function is a scaled reflection of expected inaccuracy (a quantity also ...
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Acta Analytica, 2008
It is generally assumed that there are (at least) two fundamental epistemic goals: believing truths, and avoiding the acceptance of falsehoods. As has been often noted, these goals are in conflict with one another. Moreover, the norms governing rational belief that we should derive from these two goals depend on how we weight them relative to one ...
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It is generally assumed that there are (at least) two fundamental epistemic goals: believing truths, and avoiding the acceptance of falsehoods. As has been often noted, these goals are in conflict with one another. Moreover, the norms governing rational belief that we should derive from these two goals depend on how we weight them relative to one ...
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Epistemic Risk and Picking Posteriors
2022AbstractIn the preceding two chapters, I asked how we should use epistemic utilities to pick our priors. In this chapter, I turn my attention to picking posteriors. In the early section, I consider and reject a range of possible approaches. Then I turn to an argument by Dmitri Gallow (2019) that we should pick our posteriors by maximising expected ...
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Interests, Disagreement and Epistemic Risk
Dialogue, 2013In this paper, I develop an interest-relative theory of justification in order to answer the question, “How can I maintain that P when someone whom I consider to be my epistemic peer maintains that not-P?” The answer to this question cannot be determined by looking at evidence alone, I argue, since justification cannot be determined by looking at ...
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