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Epistemic Risk and Community Policing:
The Southern Journal of Philosophy, 2006AbstractIn his paper “The Social Diffusion of Warrant and Rationality,” Sanford Goldberg argues that relying on testimony makes the warrant for our beliefs “socially diffuse” and that this diminishes our capacity to rationally police our beliefs. Thus, according to Goldberg, rationality itself is socially diffuse. I argue that while testimonial warrant
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Erkenntnis, 2012
In ‘Single premise deduction and risk’ (2008) Maria Lasonen-Aarnio argues that there is a kind of epistemically threatening risk that can accumulate over the course of drawing single premise deductive inferences. As a result, we have a new reason for denying that knowledge is closed under single premise deduction—one that mirrors a familiar reason for ...
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In ‘Single premise deduction and risk’ (2008) Maria Lasonen-Aarnio argues that there is a kind of epistemically threatening risk that can accumulate over the course of drawing single premise deductive inferences. As a result, we have a new reason for denying that knowledge is closed under single premise deduction—one that mirrors a familiar reason for ...
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The Role of Epistemic Uncertainty in Risk Analysis
2010The notion of uncertainty has been a controversial issue for a long time. In particular the prominence of probability theory in the scientific arena has blurred some distinctions that were present from its inception, namely between uncertainty due to the variability of physical phenomena, and uncertainty due to a lack of information.
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Moore's Paradox and Epistemic Risk
The Philosophical Quarterly, 1996L'A. propose de resoudre le paradoxe de Moore, selon lequel l'affirmation de conjonctions contraires croire que p et croire que non-p est absurde et non pas contradictoire, en se referant a la part d'erreur inherente au concept de croyance, appelee risque ...
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Epistemic Risk and Picking Priors I
2022AbstractIn this chapter, I argue in favour of the family of decision rules that I will apply to the choice of prior credences. The family is called the generalised Hurwicz Criterion. Each decision rule within the family is specified by a set of generalised Hurwicz weights. Each weight is a number.
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Inductive Risk, Epistemic Risk, and Overdiagnosis of Disease
Perspectives on Science, 2016Recent philosophers of science have not only revived the classical argument from inductive risk but extended it. I argue that some of the purported extensions do not fit cleanly within the schema of the original argument, and I discuss the problem of overdiagnosis of disease due to expanded disease definitions in order to show that there are some risks
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Composite multilinearity, epistemic uncertainty and risk achievement worth
European Journal of Operational Research, 2012zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.
BORGONOVO, EMANUELE, C. L. Smith
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Epistemic Risk Reduction in Psychedelic-Assisted Therapy
Belief change is crucial to therapeutic benefit in psychedelic-assisted therapy as well as in more traditional forms of therapy. However, the use of psychedelics comes with a few unique challenges that require extra caution. First, drastic belief changes may occur faster than in regular therapy.Chiara, Caporuscio +1 more
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Testimony and Epistemic Risk: The Dependence Account
Social Epistemology, 2014In this paper, I give an answer to the central epistemic question regarding the normative requirements for beliefs based on testimony. My suggestion here is that our best strategy for coming up with the conditions for justification is to look at cases where the adoption of the belief matters to the person considering it.
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Epistemic Permissivism and Risk Assessment in Irrationality
MindAbstract A popular version of epistemic permissivism says that, given the total evidence, there is sometimes a permissible credence range in a proposition. Ginger Schultheis (2018) offers a dominance argument against this. Schultheis argues that it is irrational to have a credence at the edge of any permissible range because the edge ...
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