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Journal of Strategy and Management, 2017
PurposeThe purpose of this paper is to examine how executive pay schemes influence managerial efficiency, which the authors measure as the risk-adjusted firm performance.Design/methodology/approachThe authors utilized hierarchical regression to test the hypotheses.FindingsThe authors find that as options constitute a higher percentage of total ...
William Kline +3 more
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PurposeThe purpose of this paper is to examine how executive pay schemes influence managerial efficiency, which the authors measure as the risk-adjusted firm performance.Design/methodology/approachThe authors utilized hierarchical regression to test the hypotheses.FindingsThe authors find that as options constitute a higher percentage of total ...
William Kline +3 more
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Compensation & Benefits Review, 2014
Economic profit (EP) is often portrayed as a gauge of company and executive performance that can align the interests of shareholders and corporate executives. We report the results of an investigation into the relationship between EP and compensation paid to “named executive officers” (NEOs) for an extensive sample of companies, over several years ...
Paul W. Farris +4 more
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Economic profit (EP) is often portrayed as a gauge of company and executive performance that can align the interests of shareholders and corporate executives. We report the results of an investigation into the relationship between EP and compensation paid to “named executive officers” (NEOs) for an extensive sample of companies, over several years ...
Paul W. Farris +4 more
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The Journal of Wealth Management, 2002
Many executives hold large concentrated positions in the stock of their own companies, whether in the form of incentive stock options, nonqualified stock options, restricted stock, or unrestricted stock. Executives have several reasons for divesting some or all of their concentrated positions.
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Many executives hold large concentrated positions in the stock of their own companies, whether in the form of incentive stock options, nonqualified stock options, restricted stock, or unrestricted stock. Executives have several reasons for divesting some or all of their concentrated positions.
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Indexing Executive Compensation Contracts
SSRN Electronic Journal, 2012We analyze the efficiency of indexing executive pay by calibrating the standard compensation model to a large sample of U.S. CEOs. The benefits from indexing the strike price of options are small, and fully indexing all options would increase compensation costs by 50% for most firms.
Dittmann, Ingolf +2 more
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Compensation & Benefits Review, 1996
To create an effective executive compensation paclcage, you must consider key tax and securities laws and ERISA.
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To create an effective executive compensation paclcage, you must consider key tax and securities laws and ERISA.
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Short-Termism of Executive Compensation
SSRN Electronic Journal, 2011Abstract This paper presents an optimal contracting theory of short-term firm behavior. Contracts inducing short-sighted managerial behavior arise as shareholders’ response to conflicting intergenerational managerial incentives. High-return projects may last longer than the tenure of managers who implement them. Consequently, inducing managers to act
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Administering executive compensation
Business Horizons, 1959Abstract The good intentions of many a chief executive have been dissipated by the lack of sound compensation planning and control information. It is not enough to espouse a competitive philosophy. All the elements that are part of such an environment need to be integrated into a program consistent with this objective.
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