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Narrowing the Explanatory Gap with Bridge Metaphors.

, 2014
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A dissolution of the problem of the explanatory gap

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The explanatory gap is still there

Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 2001
I argue that O'Regan & Noë's (O&N's) theory is in a no better position than any other theory to solve the “hard problem” of consciousness. Getting rid of the explanatory gap by exchanging sensorimotor contingencies for neural representations is an illusion.
Klaus Oberauer
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Constitution and the explanatory gap

SynthÈse, 2007
Proponents of the explanatory gap claim that consciousness is a mystery. No one has ever given an account of how a physical thing could be identical to a phenomenal one. We fully understand the identity between water and H2O but the identity between pain and the firing of C-fibers is inconceivable.
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The Explanatory Gap

2022
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On widening the explanatory gap

Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 1997
The explanatory gap refers to the lack of concepts for understanding “how it is that . . . a state of consciousness comes about as a result of irritating nervous tissue.” By assuming that there are colours in the outside world, Block needlessly widens this gap and Lycan and Kitcher simply fail to see the gap. When such assumptions are abandoned,
A. H. C. van der Heijden, P. T. W. Hudson, A. G. Kurvink   +2 more
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Cortical Activity and the Explanatory Gap

Consciousness and Cognition, 1998
An exploration is given of neural network features now being uncovered in cortical processing which begins to go a little way to help bridge the "Explanatory Gap" between phenomenal consciousness and correlated brain activity. A survey of properties suggested as being possessed by phenomenal consciousness leads to a set of criteria to be required of ...
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Reductive Explanation and the ‘Explanatory Gap’

Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 2004
Can phenomenal consciousness be given a reductive natural explanation? Exponents of an ‘explanatory gap’ between physical, functional and intentional facts, on the one hand, and the facts of phenomenal consciousness, on the other, argue that there are reasons of principle why phenomenal consciousness cannot be reductively explained: Jackson (1982 ...
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The Explanatory Gap

2009
Abstract This article outlines the strategy for reconciling materialism and the explanatory gap. As one might imagine, there are a number of complex issues that must be sorted out concerning the alleged special nature of phenomenal concepts, and their alleged incommensurability with non-phenomenal concepts, before one can determine ...
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