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Another Opening in the Explanatory Gap
Consciousness and Cognition, 1998Taylor’s paper purports to bridge the explanatory gap between neurophysiological function and phenomenal experience (PE). He suggests properties of PE, attempts to show how these properties map onto underlying neural information processing, and argues that a particular form of neural network, the locally recurrent network, has the requisite properties ...
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2002
AbstractJoseph Levine argues that there is an “explanatory gap” between the brain and the conscious mind. Papineau agrees that there is such a gap, but points out that similar gaps are found with all identity claims involving directly referring terms, and so the gap does nothing to discredit materialism.
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AbstractJoseph Levine argues that there is an “explanatory gap” between the brain and the conscious mind. Papineau agrees that there is such a gap, but points out that similar gaps are found with all identity claims involving directly referring terms, and so the gap does nothing to discredit materialism.
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Visual acquaintance, action and the explanatory gap
Synthese, 2018Much attention has recently been paid to the idea, which I label ‘External World Acquaintance’ (EWA), that the phenomenal character of perceptual experience is partially constituted by external features. One motivation for EWA which has received relatively little discussion is its alleged ability to help deal with the ‘Explanatory Gap’.
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Consciousness-Dependence and the Explanatory Gap
Inquiry, 2002Contrary to certain rumours, the mind-body problem is alive and well. So argues Joseph Levine in Purple Haze: The Puzzle of Consciousness . The main argument is simple enough. Considerations of causal efficacy require us to accept that subjective experiential, or 'phenomenal', properties are realized in basic non-mental, probably physical properties ...
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Phenomenology, Objectivity, and the Explanatory Gap
The Southern Journal of Philosophy, 2017AbstractThere has been much recent discussion of whether Husserlian phenomenology might be relevant to the explanatory gap—the problem of explaining how conscious experience arises from nonexperiential events or processes. However, some phenomenologists have argued that the explanatory gap is a confused problem, because it starts by assuming a false ...
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The explanatory gap: Progress and problems.
Psychology of Consciousness: Theory, Research, and Practice, 2021openaire +2 more sources
Dodging the explanatory gap – or bridging it
Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 2007AbstractAssuming our understanding of the brain continues to advance, we will at some point have a computational theory of how access consciousness works. Block's supposed additional kind of consciousness will not appear in this theory, and continued belief in it will be difficult to sustain. Appeals to “what it's like” to experience such-and-such will
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Pain, qualia, and the explanatory gap
Philosophical Psychology, 1998Abstract This paper investigates the status of the purported explanatory gap between pain phenomena and natural science, when the “gap” is thought to exist due to the special properties of experience designated by “qualia” or “the pain quale” in the case of pain experiences.
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Is Explanatory Gap to be Expected?
2007Today we know a neurological basis of many mental states and procesees, however, we do not know why we experience these neurological states exactly the way that we experience them rather than some other way. We know what is like to have increased level of adrenaline (C9H13NO3), that is the feeling of facing danger, excitemen and agression.
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