Results 91 to 100 of about 39,435 (218)
In natural language communication, we frequently clarify linguistic utterances by referring to a commonly experienced reality through the use of indexicals. That is, demonstratives like ''this'', in connection with a real reference act like a finger-pointing.
openaire +3 more sources
So-called 'Frege cases' pose a challenge for anyone who would hope to treat the contents of beliefs (and similar mental states) as Russellian propositions: It is then impossible to explain people's behavior in Frege cases without invoking non-intentional
Heck, Richard
core
O presente texto tem como objetivo estabelecer algumas relações entre o poema de Parmênides e as Investigações Lógicas, de Frege. Mais especificamente, nosso objetivo é iluminar certos aspectos do poema de Parmênides por meio de uma comparação com certas
Rafael Huguenin
doaj
The starting point of the article is a passage in Tarski’s work entitled The Semantic Concept of Truth and the Foundations of Semantics (1944), in which he points out the difference between the concept of truth and other semantic concepts.
Maciej Chlewicki
doaj +1 more source
Force, content and the varieties of unity (old version) [PDF]
[This is an old version which is superseded by the published version. I keep it here for the record, as it has been cited.] A strict dichotomy between the force / mode of speech acts and intentional states and their propositional content has ...
Schmitz, Michael
core
This papers aims at clarifying some misunderstandings that seem to block an adequate account of de re thoughts within the Fregean framework. It is usually assumed that Fregean senses cannot be de re, or dependent upon objects. Contrary to this assumption,
Alves, Marco Aurelio Sousa
core
Sense Problem in Analytical Philosophy
Object of research in the article are the basic concepts of the sense which has developed in analytical philosophy. Recognizing that the bases of an analytical paradigm of sense are put by G. Frege, the author gives primary attention to the analysis of a
Larissa A Demina
doaj
The Joint Philosophical Program of Russell and Wittgenstein and Its Demise
Between April and November 1912, Bertrand Russell and Ludwig Wittgenstein were engaged in a joint philosophical program. Wittgenstein’s meeting with Gottlob Frege in December 1912 led, however, to its dissolution—the joint program was abandoned.
Nikolay Milkov
doaj
Proof Complexity of Modal Resolution. [PDF]
Sigley S, Beyersdorff O.
europepmc +1 more source
Frege on intuition and objecthood in projective geometry. [PDF]
Eder G.
europepmc +1 more source

