Results 221 to 230 of about 19,986 (262)
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2005
Abstract Introduces extensive form games. Informations structures—perfect, imperfect, and incomplete information are explained. Pure behavioural and mixed strategies are defined. Finally, perfect recall and the equivalence of mixed and behavioural strategies (in terms of end point distributions) is considered.
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Abstract Introduces extensive form games. Informations structures—perfect, imperfect, and incomplete information are explained. Pure behavioural and mixed strategies are defined. Finally, perfect recall and the equivalence of mixed and behavioural strategies (in terms of end point distributions) is considered.
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Journal of Economic Theory, 2016
zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.
Itai Arieli, Yakov Babichenko
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zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.
Itai Arieli, Yakov Babichenko
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Playing Extensive Form Games in Parallel
2010Consider a player playing against different opponents in two extensive form games simultaneously. Can she then have a strategy in one game using information from the other? The famous example of playing chess against two grandmasters simultaneously illustrates such reasoning.
Ghosh, S., Ramanujam, R., Simon, S.
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THE H-STRATEGIES IN EXTENSIVE FORM GAMES
International Game Theory Review, 1999The paper is devoted to the problem of the equivalence of the strategies in extensive form games. The notion of H-strategies is introduced and it is proved that every strategy is equivalent to a certain H-strategy.
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2021
This chapter on games in extensive form is a convex combination of chapter III (on extensive-form decisions) and chapter X (on games in strategic form). We consider games of (nearly) perfect information without moves by nature.
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This chapter on games in extensive form is a convex combination of chapter III (on extensive-form decisions) and chapter X (on games in strategic form). We consider games of (nearly) perfect information without moves by nature.
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2019
This chapter deals with games in extensive form. Here an explicit evolution of the interaction is given, describing precisely when each player plays, what actions are available and what information is available to each player when he makes a decision.
Rida Laraki +2 more
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This chapter deals with games in extensive form. Here an explicit evolution of the interaction is given, describing precisely when each player plays, what actions are available and what information is available to each player when he makes a decision.
Rida Laraki +2 more
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2017
This chapter discusses a number of key concepts for extensive form game representation. It first considers a matrix that defines a zero-sum matrix game for which the minimizer has two actions and the maximizer has three actions and shows that the matrix description, by itself, does not capture the information structure of the game and, in fact, other ...
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This chapter discusses a number of key concepts for extensive form game representation. It first considers a matrix that defines a zero-sum matrix game for which the minimizer has two actions and the maximizer has three actions and shows that the matrix description, by itself, does not capture the information structure of the game and, in fact, other ...
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2019
There are other ways to represent games, and so we show how to adapt the coordinate system. (Readers more interested in normal form games with more players could jump ahead to the next chapter.) In a single-shot normal form game, it is standard to assume that each player makes their strategic choices simultaneously, or, at least, without knowledge of ...
Daniel T. Jessie, Donald G. Saari
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There are other ways to represent games, and so we show how to adapt the coordinate system. (Readers more interested in normal form games with more players could jump ahead to the next chapter.) In a single-shot normal form game, it is standard to assume that each player makes their strategic choices simultaneously, or, at least, without knowledge of ...
Daniel T. Jessie, Donald G. Saari
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2007
Because all players choose their strategies simultaneously, normal form representations of games are static. Many applications in political science, however, involve players choosing strategies sequentially. Although it is possible to model these situations as games in the normal form, it is often easier and more satisfying to use the extensive form,
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Because all players choose their strategies simultaneously, normal form representations of games are static. Many applications in political science, however, involve players choosing strategies sequentially. Although it is possible to model these situations as games in the normal form, it is often easier and more satisfying to use the extensive form,
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1994
All the games that we consider in this book have certain things in common. These are: There is a finite set of players (who may be people, groups of people, or more abstract entities like computer programs or “nature” or “the house”). Each player has complete knowledge of the rules of the game.
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All the games that we consider in this book have certain things in common. These are: There is a finite set of players (who may be people, groups of people, or more abstract entities like computer programs or “nature” or “the house”). Each player has complete knowledge of the rules of the game.
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