Results 111 to 120 of about 7,620 (256)
Do Different Groups Have Different Epistemic Intuitions? A Reply to Jennifer Nagel [PDF]
Intuitions play an important role in contemporary epistemology. Over the last decade, however, experimental philosophers have published a number of studies suggesting that epistemic intuitions may vary in ways that challenge the widespread reliance on ...
Stich, Stephen
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Justified True Belief + Diachronic Justification: A Contemporary Defence
I defend a diachronic constraint on justification as a necessary condition for knowledge. In my view (JTB + D), a belief is knowledge-apt only if its justification is maintainable over a context-sensitive interval Δ under ordinary avenues of evidence ...
Ahmet Küçükuncular
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How should we react to the contention that there is empirical evidence showing that many judge Gettier cases to be cases of knowledge, contrary to the verdict of most analytical philosophers about these cases? I argue that there is no single answer to this question.
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O Problema de Gettier (doravante PG) é um marco na epistemologia contemporânea. Passado meio-século do sismo filosófico causado pelo famoso artigo de Gettier (1963), as réplicas continuam e a discussão em torno do problema reacende-se.
Rodrigues, Luís Estevinha
doaj
Condiciones para saber. (Sobre un artículo de Edmund L. Gettier)
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Hugo Padilla
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Evidence, Epistemic Luck, Reliability, and Knowledge. [PDF]
Engel M.
europepmc +1 more source
SOBRE CÓMO JUSTIFICAMOS NUESTRAS CREENCIAS: ¿ES 2 + 2 = 4?
En el presente artículo, pretendo analizar los conceptos de verdad, falsedad y creencia; esto, a la luz de los planteamientos de Edmund Gettier, quien a su vez examina las tentativas sugeridas por Chisholm y Ayer.
Oscar David Caicedo M.
doaj
Responses to Herman Cappelen and Jennifer Nado. [PDF]
Machery E.
europepmc +1 more source
Self-referential Gettier Sentences
We construct new examples of justified true belief that do not constitute knowledge. In contrast to normal Gettier examples, if our counterexamples are used, the demonstration that justified true belief is not sufficient for knowledge requires only that belief and knowledge are both conceived as predicates and that basic syntactic reasoning is ...
Halbach, V, Horsten, L
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Epistemic Value and Fortuitous Truth
Why are the conditions for propositional knowledge so difficult to discover or devise in this post-Gettier age? Why do not most epistemologists agree on roughly the same analysis as they appear to have done in the pre-Gettier paradise?
Colin Cheyne
doaj

