Results 1 to 10 of about 157 (151)

THE NOTHINGNESS OF THE GETTIER PROBLEM [PDF]

open access: yesSocial Sciences, Humanities and Education Journal, 2020
This work, “The Nothingness” of the Gettier Problem is an attempt to deconstruct the popularly held view that a fourth condition may be necessary for the Traditional Account of Knowledge otherwise known as JTB.
Tom Eneji Ogar, Edor J. Edor
doaj   +2 more sources

Anti-luck epistemology and the Gettier problem [PDF]

open access: yesPhilosophical Studies, 2014
A certain construal of the Gettier problem is offered, according to which this problem concerns the task of identifying the anti-luck condition on knowledge. A methodology for approaching this construal of the Gettier problem—anti-luck epistemology—is set out, and the utility of such a methodology is demonstrated.
Duncan Pritchard, Pritchard Duncan
exaly   +4 more sources

A Thomistic Approach to the Gettier Problem

open access: yesJournal for the History of Analytical Philosophy
Epistemologists have been discussing the Gettier problem (GP) for 60 years. Numerous proposals have been suggested to solve it. In this article, I argue that the problem can be dismissed if we consider it in light of Thomas Aquinas’s view of truth ...
Roberto Di Ceglie
doaj   +2 more sources

The Gettier Problem from a Position of Rational Skepticism [PDF]

open access: yesАнтиномии, 2021
This article focuses on the discussion of the Gettier problem, which has remained an unresolved epistemological puzzle for more than half a century. Counterexamples proposed by E.
Rustem A. Yartsev
doaj   +1 more source

Scientific Knowledge: Virtue Epistemology vs Rational Skepticism [PDF]

open access: yesАнтиномии, 2022
This article is devoted to a critical analysis of the epistemology of virtues as a relatively new philosophical trend, the interest in which is noticeably increasing.
Rustem A. Yartsev
doaj   +1 more source

Is Justified True Belief Traditional Analysis of Knowledge? [PDF]

open access: yesОмский научный вестник: Серия "Общество. История. Современность", 2022
The article makes a general argument against understanding the concept of knowledge as a justified true belief (JTB) as a traditional. For this purpose, it analyzes the works of researchers who begin question the traditionality of JTB. Their arguments
A. M. Kardash
doaj   +1 more source

The Gettier Problem: An Analysis in the Context of al-Fārābī’s Epistemic Levels

open access: yesİslam Tetkikleri Dergisi, 2022
In the history of philosophy, knowledge has been defined in the traditional sense since Plato as justified true belief. Despite the dominance of this definition in epistemology, the adequacy of the fundamental elements that make up definitive knowledge ...
Muhammed Abdullah Haksever
doaj   +1 more source

Recent Work on Reliabilist Virtue Epistemology [PDF]

open access: yesJournal of Philosophical Investigations, 2023
The paper aims to examine and criticize recent approaches suggested by some virtue reliabilists. To this end, section 2 provides a sketch of Sosa’s triple account of knowledge, on which knowledge is described as a cognitive achievement and an apt belief.
Mohammad Hossein Mohamad Ali Khalaj
doaj   +1 more source

Epistemic Luck and Anti-Luck Epistemology in the View of Duncan Pritchard [PDF]

open access: yesPizhūhish/hā-yi Falsafī- Kalāmī, 2023
The problem of epistemic luck arises when a person has a true belief that is only true by luck. Before Gettier, it was believed that the element of justification would be sufficient for knowledge; but he showed that it is possible to have a justified ...
Fatemeh Meshkibaf   +2 more
doaj   +1 more source

What’s wrong with Irrefutability and Defeasibility Proposals to Gettier Problems? [PDF]

open access: yesحکمت و فلسفه, 2011
Gettier problems are cases, or examples, which appear to run counter JTB analyses of knowledge as justified true belief. According to JTB theory of knowledge, S knows p, only if: a) The proposition p in true; b) S believes that p; c) S is justified in ...
mohammad ali abbasian
doaj   +1 more source

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