Results 21 to 30 of about 5,732,718 (131)

Manifest Failure: The Gettier Problem Solved

open access: yes, 2020
This paper provides a principled and elegant solution to the Gettier problem. The key move is to draw a general metaphysical distinction and conscript it for epistemological purposes. Section 1 introduces the Gettier problem.
John Turri
core   +1 more source

A Critique on the Solution of Zakzewoski’s Virtue Responsibilism to the Gettier Problem

open access: yesReligion and Social Communication
Edmund Gettier demonstrated that the traditional analysis of knowledge (as a justified true belief) is insufficient. Some philosophers have proposed that virtue epistemology holds the key to solving the Gettier problem.
Liu Caiqin
doaj   +1 more source

Sorte, virtude, e anulabilidade epistêmica

open access: yesPrincipia: An International Journal of Epistemology, 2016
Duncan Pritchard has suggested that anti-luck epistemology and virtue epistemology are the best options to solve the Gettier problem. Nonetheless, there are challenging problems for both of them in the literature.
João Rizzio Vicente Fett
doaj   +1 more source

The maturation of the Gettier problem [PDF]

open access: yesPhilosophical Studies, 2014
Edmund Gettier s paper Is Justified True Belief Knowledge? first appeared in an issue of Analysis (Vol. 23, No. 6), dated June of 1963, and although it s tempting (and common) to wax hyperbolic when discussing the paper s importance and influence, it is fair to say that its impact on contemporary philosophy has been substantial and wide-ranging ...
openaire   +1 more source

Knowledge and Argument

open access: yesNoûs, EarlyView.
ABSTRACT I argue that knowledge plays a distinctive role in psychological explanation that weaker epistemic states cannot because it is robust in the face of counterevidence in a way that they are not. Being robust in the face of counterevidence makes your belief robust in the face of counterargument.
Spencer Paulson
wiley   +1 more source

Referential Indeterminacy and De Re Thoughts

open access: yesNoûs, EarlyView.
ABSTRACT Referential indeterminacy may seem to leave little room for de re or singular thoughts about ordinary objects. I argue that this impression is misleading. We can direct our thoughts at particular objects, even though there is no fact of the matter as to which objects are referred to by the singular terms purporting to stand for them.
Bahram Assadian
wiley   +1 more source

Moral certainty and the wrongness of killing: A non‐propositional view

open access: yesPhilosophical Investigations, Volume 49, Issue 2, Page 170-194, April 2026.
Abstract In 2008 I published a paper making the case that Wittgenstein's On Certainty reflections can be fruitfully extended to cast light on the foundations of our moral lives and practices. My primary example was that the wrongness of killing is a basic moral certainty.
Nigel Pleasants
wiley   +1 more source

ON HISTORICAL (ANTI‐)REALISM

open access: yesHistory and Theory, Volume 65, Issue 1, Page 58-82, March 2026.
ABSTRACT The problem of historical realism has gained some new momentum recently, with a fresh challenge to what is taken to be an anti‐realist hegemony in the theory and philosophy of history. Unfortunately, this has also provided the opportunity for the reheating of old polemics and lazy scholarship that characterized the 1990s reaction to ...
João Ohara
wiley   +1 more source

Mistreating Consent

open access: yesPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research, Volume 112, Issue 2, Page 544-560, March 2026.
ABSTRACT Consent plays an important role in our lives. Using someone's body or property without their consent is typically a serious wrong. However, there are various ways in which consensual interactions may be morally deficient. This paper articulates an underexplored way in which consent can be defective, namely by being moot.
Elise Woodard
wiley   +1 more source

Preservationism in Memory

open access: yesRatio, Volume 39, Issue 1, Page 10-16, March 2026.
ABSTRACT Preservationism in the philosophy of memory is dead, according to many. This opinion is not ill‐founded. It appears to be justified both by common sense and by empirical psychology. But in what follows we explain how and why an independently motivated form of preservationism, modal preservationism, survives.
Sven Bernecker, Paul Silva Jr
wiley   +1 more source

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