Results 21 to 30 of about 157 (151)
Moral certainty and the wrongness of killing: A non‐propositional view
Philosophical Investigations, Volume 49, Issue 2, Page 170-194, April 2026.Abstract In 2008 I published a paper making the case that Wittgenstein's On Certainty reflections can be fruitfully extended to cast light on the foundations of our moral lives and practices. My primary example was that the wrongness of killing is a basic moral certainty.
Nigel Pleasants
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The maturation of the Gettier problem [PDF]
Philosophical Studies, 2014 Edmund Gettier s paper Is Justified True Belief Knowledge? first appeared in an issue of Analysis (Vol. 23, No. 6), dated June of 1963, and although it s tempting (and common) to wax hyperbolic when discussing the paper s importance and influence, it is fair to say that its impact on contemporary philosophy has been substantial and wide-ranging ...
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History and Theory, Volume 65, Issue 1, Page 58-82, March 2026.ABSTRACT The problem of historical realism has gained some new momentum recently, with a fresh challenge to what is taken to be an anti‐realist hegemony in the theory and philosophy of history. Unfortunately, this has also provided the opportunity for the reheating of old polemics and lazy scholarship that characterized the 1990s reaction to ...
João Ohara
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Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Volume 112, Issue 2, Page 544-560, March 2026.ABSTRACT Consent plays an important role in our lives. Using someone's body or property without their consent is typically a serious wrong. However, there are various ways in which consensual interactions may be morally deficient. This paper articulates an underexplored way in which consent can be defective, namely by being moot.
Elise Woodard
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Ratio, Volume 39, Issue 1, Page 10-16, March 2026.ABSTRACT Preservationism in the philosophy of memory is dead, according to many. This opinion is not ill‐founded. It appears to be justified both by common sense and by empirical psychology. But in what follows we explain how and why an independently motivated form of preservationism, modal preservationism, survives.
Sven Bernecker, Paul Silva Jr
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Os anulabilismos de Klein e de Swain e o problema de Gettier
Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology, 2010 In this essay, we intend to show that Peter Klein and Marshall Swain defeasibility theories do not resolve the Gettier problem. Klein postulates, to any Gettier counterexample, that there is a true proposition which, when associated with evidence-e of S,
Emerson Carlos Valcarenghi
doaj
Epistemology & Philosophy of Science, 2019 Theories, that answering the question “What is knowledge?” in analytic epistemology appears under the influence of Gettier cases – a way of refutation such theories of knowledge, that have truth and belief as constituent elements. In the paper were analyzed basic strategies of solving the Gettier problem. One way is to save the analysis of knowledge by
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Future in Educational Research, Volume 3, Issue 4, Page 569-579, December 2025.ABSTRACT This conceptual essay, grounded in a close reading of Plato's Theaetetus, argues that before educators can effectively operationalise critical thinking as the rigorous evaluation ('stress‐testing') of competing knowledge claims, university students must first understand foundational epistemological principles rooted in Plato's tripartite ...
Gerry Dunne
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Implications of Rejecting Common‐Sense Realism for the Practice and Aim of Knowledge‐Based Education
Educational Theory, Volume 75, Issue 6, Page 1107-1129, December 2025.Abstract In this article, I assume that it is universally accepted that education—at least sometimes—should aim at knowledge. Moreover, I take my point of departure from the classical (and minimal) definition of knowledge in terms of justified true belief (JTB).
Henrik Friberg‐Fernros
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Knowledge first, all the way down
Philosophical Investigations, Volume 48, Issue 4, Page 363-376, October 2025.Abstract Knowledge‐first philosophy has fewer adherents than it should. It has the potential to address many of the common problems facing epistemologists, but it is counter‐intuitive in some respects. In this paper, I make the case that the underlying metaphysics of Timothy Williamson's account of knowledge‐first is responsible for some of this ...
Tess Dewhurst
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