Results 31 to 40 of about 5,732,718 (131)

Gettier Problem

open access: yesEpistemology & Philosophy of Science, 2019
Theories, that answering the question “What is knowledge?” in analytic epistemology appears under the influence of Gettier cases – a way of refutation such theories of knowledge, that have truth and belief as constituent elements. In the paper were analyzed basic strategies of solving the Gettier problem. One way is to save the analysis of knowledge by
openaire   +1 more source

Teaching Students to Understand Knowledge: Stress‐Testing the ‘Justified True Belief Account’ for Critical Thinking

open access: yesFuture in Educational Research, Volume 3, Issue 4, Page 569-579, December 2025.
ABSTRACT This conceptual essay, grounded in a close reading of Plato's Theaetetus, argues that before educators can effectively operationalise critical thinking as the rigorous evaluation ('stress‐testing') of competing knowledge claims, university students must first understand foundational epistemological principles rooted in Plato's tripartite ...
Gerry Dunne
wiley   +1 more source

Implications of Rejecting Common‐Sense Realism for the Practice and Aim of Knowledge‐Based Education

open access: yesEducational Theory, Volume 75, Issue 6, Page 1107-1129, December 2025.
Abstract In this article, I assume that it is universally accepted that education—at least sometimes—should aim at knowledge. Moreover, I take my point of departure from the classical (and minimal) definition of knowledge in terms of justified true belief (JTB).
Henrik Friberg‐Fernros
wiley   +1 more source

Knowledge first, all the way down

open access: yesPhilosophical Investigations, Volume 48, Issue 4, Page 363-376, October 2025.
Abstract Knowledge‐first philosophy has fewer adherents than it should. It has the potential to address many of the common problems facing epistemologists, but it is counter‐intuitive in some respects. In this paper, I make the case that the underlying metaphysics of Timothy Williamson's account of knowledge‐first is responsible for some of this ...
Tess Dewhurst
wiley   +1 more source

Basing on Absences

open access: yesPhilosophical Issues, Volume 35, Issue 1, Page 29-39, October 2025.
ABSTRACT When what justifies you in believing a proposition is some evidence you have, you are doxastically justified only if you believe that proposition on the basis of that evidence. According to causal theories of basing, this basing relation must be a causal relation.
Juan Comesaña, Carolina Sartorio
wiley   +1 more source

The Agent-Centered Interpretation of Knowledge in Virtue Epistemology

open access: yesFelsefe Arkivi
This article examines virtue epistemology—an increasingly prominent approach in contemporary epistemology —through the lens of an agent centered interpretation of knowledge.
Fikret Yılmaz
doaj   +1 more source

Inquisitive Knowledge Attribution and the Gettier Problem

open access: yesProceedings of the Amsterdam Colloquium, 2011
A disjunctive belief cannot be described as knowledge if the subject does not justifiably believe a true disjunct, even if the whole disjunctive belief is true and justified (Gettier 1963). This phenomenon is problematic if the verb know semantically operates on a (classical) proposition, as standardly assumed. In this paper, I offer a solution to this
openaire   +2 more sources

Referential Understanding, Luck, and Knowledge of Reference

open access: yesPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research, Volume 111, Issue 2, Page 590-606, September 2025.
Abstract In some cases of communication, the hearer misunderstands the referential part of the speaker's utterance although she identifies the speaker's referent. What more is needed for referential understanding? One view is that the hearer must know what the speaker refers to.
Victor Tamburini
wiley   +1 more source

Why Do Children From Age 4 Fail True Belief Tasks? A Decision Experiment Testing Competence Versus Performance Limitation Accounts

open access: yesCognitive Science, Volume 49, Issue 6, June 2025.
Abstract The standard view on Theory of Mind (ToM) is that the mastery of the false belief (FB) task around age 4 marks the ontogenetic emergence of full‐fledged meta‐representational ToM. Recently, a puzzling finding has emerged: Once children master the FB task, they begin to fail true belief (TB) control tasks. This finding threatens the validity of
Lydia Paulin Schidelko, Hannes Rakoczy
wiley   +1 more source

Epistemic Value and Fortuitous Truth

open access: yesPrincipia: An International Journal of Epistemology, 1997
Why are the conditions for propositional knowledge so difficult to discover or devise in this post-Gettier age? Why do not most epistemologists agree on roughly the same analysis as they appear to have done in the pre-Gettier paradise?
Colin Cheyne
doaj  

Home - About - Disclaimer - Privacy