Results 31 to 40 of about 157 (151)
ABSTRACT When what justifies you in believing a proposition is some evidence you have, you are doxastically justified only if you believe that proposition on the basis of that evidence. According to causal theories of basing, this basing relation must be a causal relation.
Juan Comesaña, Carolina Sartorio
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On the significance of L. Zagzebski’s results for solving the Gettier problem
The article is devoted to the analysis of the authoritative research results of L. Zagzebski on the Gettier problem, which has not been solved for many years.
R. A. Yartsev
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Referential Understanding, Luck, and Knowledge of Reference
Abstract In some cases of communication, the hearer misunderstands the referential part of the speaker's utterance although she identifies the speaker's referent. What more is needed for referential understanding? One view is that the hearer must know what the speaker refers to.
Victor Tamburini
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Inquisitive Knowledge Attribution and the Gettier Problem
A disjunctive belief cannot be described as knowledge if the subject does not justifiably believe a true disjunct, even if the whole disjunctive belief is true and justified (Gettier 1963). This phenomenon is problematic if the verb know semantically operates on a (classical) proposition, as standardly assumed. In this paper, I offer a solution to this
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Abstract The standard view on Theory of Mind (ToM) is that the mastery of the false belief (FB) task around age 4 marks the ontogenetic emergence of full‐fledged meta‐representational ToM. Recently, a puzzling finding has emerged: Once children master the FB task, they begin to fail true belief (TB) control tasks. This finding threatens the validity of
Lydia Paulin Schidelko, Hannes Rakoczy
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Abstract Trust is central to epistemology, particularly in accounts of testimony, where it describes the relationship between a hearer and a speaker (or trustor and trustee), enabling the acquisition of information. The speaker's trustworthiness—marked by sincerity and knowledge—is essential for testimony to transmit knowledge or justified belief ...
Annalisa Coliva
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Epistemic Value and Fortuitous Truth
Why are the conditions for propositional knowledge so difficult to discover or devise in this post-Gettier age? Why do not most epistemologists agree on roughly the same analysis as they appear to have done in the pre-Gettier paradise?
Colin Cheyne
doaj
A modal theory of justification
Abstract This article develops a modal theory of justification, according to which a belief is justified if it is more possible that it amounts to knowledge than that it does not. The core of the theory is neutral between internalism and externalism and it solves two problems that extant modal accounts of justification suffer from.
Jaakko Hirvelä
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Justified True Belief + Diachronic Justification: A Contemporary Defence
I defend a diachronic constraint on justification as a necessary condition for knowledge. In my view (JTB + D), a belief is knowledge-apt only if its justification is maintainable over a context-sensitive interval Δ under ordinary avenues of evidence ...
Ahmet Küçükuncular
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Educating Open‐Mindedness through Philosophy in Schools
Abstract Closed‐mindedness is a characteristic trait of irresponsible believers. For this reason and others, educators should actively discourage closed‐mindedness in their students. One way to do this is to cultivate its opposing virtue: open‐mindedness.
Danielle Diver
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