Results 41 to 50 of about 5,123 (200)
Why Gettier Cases Are Still Misleading: A Reply to Atkins [PDF]
In this paper, I respond to Philip Atkins’ reply to my attempt to explain why Gettier cases (and Gettier-style cases) are misleading. I have argued that Gettier cases (and Gettier-style cases) are misdealing because the candidates for knowledge in such ...
Moti, Mizrahi
core
Perceiving and Knowing as Activities [PDF]
According to the tradition of most empiricists, perception is the basis for all our knowledge (at least of the world). The tradition also assumes that perception by humans is a passive activity resulting in some static states pertaining perception and ...
Machamer, Peter, Springle, Alison
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Implications of Rejecting Common‐Sense Realism for the Practice and Aim of Knowledge‐Based Education
Abstract In this article, I assume that it is universally accepted that education—at least sometimes—should aim at knowledge. Moreover, I take my point of departure from the classical (and minimal) definition of knowledge in terms of justified true belief (JTB).
Henrik Friberg‐Fernros
wiley +1 more source
Knowledge first, all the way down
Abstract Knowledge‐first philosophy has fewer adherents than it should. It has the potential to address many of the common problems facing epistemologists, but it is counter‐intuitive in some respects. In this paper, I make the case that the underlying metaphysics of Timothy Williamson's account of knowledge‐first is responsible for some of this ...
Tess Dewhurst
wiley +1 more source
Epistemic Relativism and the Gettier Problem
The aim of this article is to present a variant of epistemic relativism that is compatible with a language practice especially popular among scientists. We argue that in science, but also in philosophy, propositions are naturally ‘relativized’ to sets of hypotheses or theories, and that a similar language practice allows one to interpret canonical ...
Louis Vervoort, Alexander A. Shevchenko
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ABSTRACT When what justifies you in believing a proposition is some evidence you have, you are doxastically justified only if you believe that proposition on the basis of that evidence. According to causal theories of basing, this basing relation must be a causal relation.
Juan Comesaña, Carolina Sartorio
wiley +1 more source
Referential Understanding, Luck, and Knowledge of Reference
Abstract In some cases of communication, the hearer misunderstands the referential part of the speaker's utterance although she identifies the speaker's referent. What more is needed for referential understanding? One view is that the hearer must know what the speaker refers to.
Victor Tamburini
wiley +1 more source
On the significance of L. Zagzebski’s results for solving the Gettier problem
The article is devoted to the analysis of the authoritative research results of L. Zagzebski on the Gettier problem, which has not been solved for many years.
R. A. Yartsev
doaj +1 more source
Non-Pickwickian Belief and 'the Gettier Problem' [PDF]
That in Gettier's alleged counterexamples to the traditional analysis of knowledge as justified true belief the belief condition is satisfied has rarely been questioned.
Biro, John
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Abstract The standard view on Theory of Mind (ToM) is that the mastery of the false belief (FB) task around age 4 marks the ontogenetic emergence of full‐fledged meta‐representational ToM. Recently, a puzzling finding has emerged: Once children master the FB task, they begin to fail true belief (TB) control tasks. This finding threatens the validity of
Lydia Paulin Schidelko, Hannes Rakoczy
wiley +1 more source

