Results 61 to 70 of about 5,123 (200)

The Ethics of Belief Debate and the Norm of Teaching

Educational Theory, Volume 75, Issue 2, Page 374-398, April 2025.
Abstract The debate about the ethics of belief is a classic and it has given rise to wide‐ranging debates in epistemology, the philosophy of language, the philosophy of mind, as well as in ethics. In epistemology, the question is what the norms of belief are — should one believe what is true, what is well‐evidenced, what is pragmatic or what?
Ben Kotzee
wiley   +1 more source

Uma solução não convencional para o Problema de Gettier = A non-conventional solution for the Problem of Gettier

Veritas, 2012
O Problema de Gettier (doravante PG) é um marco na epistemologia contemporânea. Passado meio-século do sismo filosófico causado pelo famoso artigo de Gettier (1963), as réplicas continuam e a discussão em torno do problema reacende-se.
Rodrigues, Luís Estevinha
doaj  

The maturation of the Gettier problem [PDF]

Philosophical Studies, 2014
Edmund Gettier s paper Is Justified True Belief Knowledge? first appeared in an issue of Analysis (Vol. 23, No. 6), dated June of 1963, and although it s tempting (and common) to wax hyperbolic when discussing the paper s importance and influence, it is fair to say that its impact on contemporary philosophy has been substantial and wide-ranging ...
openaire   +1 more source

Gettiering Goldman [PDF]

, 2011
This paper examines the causal theory of knowledge put forth by Alvin Goldman in his 1967 paper “A Causal Theory of Knowing.” Goldman contends that a justified, true belief is knowledge if and only if it is causally connected to the fact that ...
Stalkfleet, Kenneth
core  

Epistemic Luck [PDF]

, 2011
Epistemic luck is a generic notion used to describe any of a number of ways in which it can be accidental, coincidental, or fortuitous that a person has a true belief.
Engel Jr, Mylan
core   +1 more source

Intuition‐denial and methods teaching: Prediction, reform, and complication

Metaphilosophy, Volume 56, Issue 2, Page 225-238, April 2025.
Abstract According to a popular theory in philosophical methodology, there is a widespread misconception among philosophers as to their own methods. This misconception is that philosophers use intuitions as evidence. This is a fascinating theory, for various reasons.
James Andow
wiley   +1 more source

Senofane e il “non sapere di sapere”

Peitho
An examination of Xenophanes’ fragment DK 21 B 34 shows how it to some extent anticipates what is known in contemporary epistemological debate as the “Gettier problem.” According to the argument underlying this problem, it is not enough to have a ...
Massimo Pulpito
doaj   +1 more source

Danger signals for untrustworthy thought experiments

Metaphilosophy, Volume 56, Issue 2, Page 209-224, April 2025.
Abstract A key question in contemporary metaphilosophy of thought experiments is the “wheat from chaff” problem: How can we separate the good and trustworthy thought experiments from the untrustworthy ones? This article examines this problem by viewing thought experimentation as a form of mental simulation.
Henri Tuohimaa
wiley   +1 more source

Classical invariantism and the puzzle of fallibilism [PDF]

, 2008
This paper revisits a puzzle that arises for theories of knowledge according to which one can know on the basis of merely inductive grounds. No matter how strong such theories require inductive grounds to be if a belief based on them is to qualify as ...
Kelp, Christoph
core   +1 more source

Evidentialism, justification, and knowledge‐first

Noûs, Volume 59, Issue 1, Page 22-46, March 2025.
Abstract This paper examines the relationship between evidentialism, knowledge‐first epistemology, (E=K) in particular, and justification. Evidentialism gives an account of justified belief in terms of evidence but is silent on the nature of evidence. Knowledge‐first tells us what evidence is but stands in need of an agreed account of justification. So
Alexander Bird
wiley   +1 more source