Results 71 to 80 of about 5,732,718 (131)
50 Years of Gettier: A New Direction in Religious Epistemology?
In this paper, I lend credence to the move toward non-reductive religious epistemology by highlighting the systematic failings of Alvin Plantinga’s seminal, religious epistemology when it comes to surmounting the Gettier Problem.
Ian Michael Church, Church, Ian Michael
core +1 more source
On the Gettier Problem for Topological Logic of Knowledge and Belief [PDF]
. Gettier’s famous examples intended to show that knowledge cannot always be equated with justified true belief. The Gettier problem can also be considered as a problem for topological epistemic logic: If knowledge and justified belief are conceived as ...
Mormann, Thomas
core +2 more sources
A Phenomenological Solution to Gettier’s Problem
In “Is Justified True Belief, Knowledge?” Gettier shows us two counter examples of analyzing Knowledge, as “Justified True Belief” or “JTB”. Lots of scholars have reconstructed similar counter examples to JTB but we can see they follow a similar algorithm.
openaire +1 more source
Both of Gettier's examples are not representative of situations in which we would claim knowledge – we do not use language in this way. Therefore, Gettier has not shown that justified true belief is insufficient for knowledge. I am not denying that there
Imbrisevic, Miroslav
core +1 more source
Intemalism, the Gettier Problem, and Metaepistemological Skepticism [PDF]
openaire +1 more source
Some of the next articles are maybe not open access.
Related searches:
Related searches:
On the Logical Unsolvability of the Gettier Problem
SynthÈse, 2004The tripartite account of propositional, fallibilist knowledge that p as justified true belief can become adequate only if it can solve the Gettier Problem. However, the latter can be solved only if the problem of a successful coordination of the resources (at least truth and justification) necessary and sufficient to deliver propositional, fallibilist
Luciano Floridi
exaly +2 more sources
1994
AbstractThis chapter examines Gettier's objections to defining knowledge as justified true belief – the so‐called Gettier problems. In response to these objections, a distinction is drawn between two kinds of justification. A person can be justified in coming to believe that p if he has been epistemically responsible in doing so.
Robert J Fogelin
exaly +2 more sources
AbstractThis chapter examines Gettier's objections to defining knowledge as justified true belief – the so‐called Gettier problems. In response to these objections, a distinction is drawn between two kinds of justification. A person can be justified in coming to believe that p if he has been epistemically responsible in doing so.
Robert J Fogelin
exaly +2 more sources
Knowledge and the Gettier Problem
2016Edmund Gettier's 1963 verdict about what knowledge is not has become an item of philosophical orthodoxy, accepted by philosophers as a genuine epistemological result. It assures us that - contrary to what Plato and later philosophers have thought - knowledge is not merely a true belief well supported by epistemic justification.
Stephen Hetherington
exaly +2 more sources
In this chapter, we will explore the luck at issue in Gettier-styled counterexamples and the subsequent problem it poses to any viable reductive analysis of knowledge.
Church, Ian M.
core +5 more sources

