Results 131 to 140 of about 230 (177)
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Episteme, 2014
AbstractI will present a problem for any externalist evidentialism that allows for accidental possession of evidence. There are Gettier cases for justification. I will describe two such cases – cases involving veridical hallucination. An analysis of the cases is given, along the lines of (reliabilist) virtue epistemology (cf. Sosa, Greco).
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AbstractI will present a problem for any externalist evidentialism that allows for accidental possession of evidence. There are Gettier cases for justification. I will describe two such cases – cases involving veridical hallucination. An analysis of the cases is given, along the lines of (reliabilist) virtue epistemology (cf. Sosa, Greco).
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Synthese, 2016
zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.
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zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.
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2017
Gettier constructed his well-known examples by assuming two things: (1) that the justification needed to know is the kind one can have for a false proposition; and (2) justificational closure— that justification is transmitted through known implication. I think both assumptions are false.
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Gettier constructed his well-known examples by assuming two things: (1) that the justification needed to know is the kind one can have for a false proposition; and (2) justificational closure— that justification is transmitted through known implication. I think both assumptions are false.
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On the Logical Unsolvability of the Gettier Problem
Synthese, 2004The tripartite account of propositional, fallibilist knowledge that p as justified true belief can become adequate only if it can solve the Gettier Problem. However, the latter can be solved only if the problem of a successful coordination of the resources (at least truth and justification) necessary and sufficient to deliver propositional, fallibilist
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2017
Gettiered beliefs are beliefs that fall short of knowledge in the way illustrated by Gettier cases: cases like those Edmund Gettier employed to show that justified true belief doesn’t suffice for knowledge. What has happened to a belief that falls short of knowledge in the way such cases illustrate? I focus initially on two leading substantive answers,
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Gettiered beliefs are beliefs that fall short of knowledge in the way illustrated by Gettier cases: cases like those Edmund Gettier employed to show that justified true belief doesn’t suffice for knowledge. What has happened to a belief that falls short of knowledge in the way such cases illustrate? I focus initially on two leading substantive answers,
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2018
Gettier cases describe situations where an agent possesses a justified true belief that p, without, at least according to mainstream analytic epistemology, knowing that p, while the “Gettier intuition” is the judgment that a protagonist in a Gettier case does not know the relevant proposition.
Edouard Machery +8 more
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Gettier cases describe situations where an agent possesses a justified true belief that p, without, at least according to mainstream analytic epistemology, knowing that p, while the “Gettier intuition” is the judgment that a protagonist in a Gettier case does not know the relevant proposition.
Edouard Machery +8 more
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The truthmaker solution to the gettier problems [PDF]
EPISTEMOLOGIA, 2015 A truthmaker solution to the Gettier problems is based on the idea that knowledge can be defined as justified true belief provided that the source of one’s justification is suitably connected with what makes the believed proposition true. Different developments of this basic intuition have been recently criticized on the basis of a series of arguments ...
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Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 1992
(1992). Gettier and scepticism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy: Vol. 70, No. 3, pp. 277-285.
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(1992). Gettier and scepticism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy: Vol. 70, No. 3, pp. 277-285.
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