Results 141 to 150 of about 230 (177)
Some of the next articles are maybe not open access.
1994
AbstractThis chapter examines Gettier's objections to defining knowledge as justified true belief – the so‐called Gettier problems. In response to these objections, a distinction is drawn between two kinds of justification. A person can be justified in coming to believe that p if he has been epistemically responsible in doing so.
openaire +1 more source
AbstractThis chapter examines Gettier's objections to defining knowledge as justified true belief – the so‐called Gettier problems. In response to these objections, a distinction is drawn between two kinds of justification. A person can be justified in coming to believe that p if he has been epistemically responsible in doing so.
openaire +1 more source
2015
In 1963, Edmund Gettier published an article containing two brief fictional stories, each intended to disprove a well-entrenched philosophical definition of knowledge. His article had a striking impact among epistemologists: a subsequent plethora of articles and sections of books gave us the broader concept of a Gettier case.
openaire +1 more source
In 1963, Edmund Gettier published an article containing two brief fictional stories, each intended to disprove a well-entrenched philosophical definition of knowledge. His article had a striking impact among epistemologists: a subsequent plethora of articles and sections of books gave us the broader concept of a Gettier case.
openaire +1 more source
2017
I revisit my ‘double-luck’ recipe for generating Gettier problems according to which a piece of good luck cancels out what would have been a piece of bad luck, giving us a case in which a belief is true and justified but is not knowledge. I then show how this formula can be used to produce Gettier cases for any definition of knowledge  according to ...
openaire +1 more source
I revisit my ‘double-luck’ recipe for generating Gettier problems according to which a piece of good luck cancels out what would have been a piece of bad luck, giving us a case in which a belief is true and justified but is not knowledge. I then show how this formula can be used to produce Gettier cases for any definition of knowledge  according to ...
openaire +1 more source
KEEPING TRACK OF THE GETTIER PROBLEM
Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 2011AbstractThis paper argues that for someone to know propositionpinferentially it is not enough that his belief inpand his justification for believingpcovary with the truth ofpthrough a sphere of possibilities. A further condition on inferential knowledge is thatp's truth‐maker is identical with, or causally related to, the state of affairs the ...
openaire +2 more sources
The Gettier Problem in informed consent
Journal of Medical Ethics, 2011The duty to procure informed consent (IC) from patients before any significant intervention is among the pillars of medical and research ethics. The provision by the doctor of relevant information about treatment and free decision-making by the patient are essential elements of IC.
openaire +2 more sources
Contextualism, Skepticism, and the Gettier Problem
Synthese, 2004The contextualist epistemological theories proposed by David Lewis and othersoffer a view of knowledge which awards a central role to the contexts ofknowledge attributions. Such contexts are held to determine how strong anepistemic position must be in order to count as knowledge.
openaire +2 more sources
Sed ubi Socrates currit? On the Gettier Problem before Gettier
2017Medieval philosophers presented Gettier-type objections to the commonly accepted view of knowledge as firmly held true belief, and formulated additional conditions that meet the objections or analyzed knowledge in a way that is immune to the Gettier-type objections.
openaire +1 more source