Results 41 to 50 of about 198 (158)

The Ethics of Belief Debate and the Norm of Teaching

Educational Theory, Volume 75, Issue 2, Page 374-398, April 2025.
Abstract The debate about the ethics of belief is a classic and it has given rise to wide‐ranging debates in epistemology, the philosophy of language, the philosophy of mind, as well as in ethics. In epistemology, the question is what the norms of belief are — should one believe what is true, what is well‐evidenced, what is pragmatic or what?
Ben Kotzee
wiley   +1 more source

Putting the horse before the cart: a pragmatist analysis of knowledge

Trans/Form/Ação, 2011
The definition of knowledge as justified true belief is the best we presently have. However, the canonical tripartite analysis of knowledge does not do justice to it due to a Platonic conception of a priori truth that puts the cart before the horse ...
Luís M. Augusto
doaj   +1 more source

A Critical Analysis of Process Reliabilism in "What is justified belief?" [PDF]

حکمت و فلسفه, 2010
Process reliabilism is one of the most important, and impressive theories in epistemology that was formulated by Alvin Goldman in "What is justified belief?" in 1970s. In this paper, first, we describe process reliablism in a simple form.
abdollah ansaari, jalal peykani
doaj   +1 more source

Intuition‐denial and methods teaching: Prediction, reform, and complication

Metaphilosophy, Volume 56, Issue 2, Page 225-238, April 2025.
Abstract According to a popular theory in philosophical methodology, there is a widespread misconception among philosophers as to their own methods. This misconception is that philosophers use intuitions as evidence. This is a fascinating theory, for various reasons.
James Andow
wiley   +1 more source

Contraexemplos à la Gettier – Serão Todos Apropriados?

Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology
Desde a publicação dos contraexemplos de Gettier à definição tradicional de conhecimento, em 1963, houve uma profusão de novos exemplos, todos eles visando mostrar haver certos casos de crença justificada verdadeira por sorte; casos que não podem ser ...
Luiz Helvécio Marques Segundo
doaj   +1 more source

Danger signals for untrustworthy thought experiments

Metaphilosophy, Volume 56, Issue 2, Page 209-224, April 2025.
Abstract A key question in contemporary metaphilosophy of thought experiments is the “wheat from chaff” problem: How can we separate the good and trustworthy thought experiments from the untrustworthy ones? This article examines this problem by viewing thought experimentation as a form of mental simulation.
Henri Tuohimaa
wiley   +1 more source

Evidentialism, justification, and knowledge‐first

Noûs, Volume 59, Issue 1, Page 22-46, March 2025.
Abstract This paper examines the relationship between evidentialism, knowledge‐first epistemology, (E=K) in particular, and justification. Evidentialism gives an account of justified belief in terms of evidence but is silent on the nature of evidence. Knowledge‐first tells us what evidence is but stands in need of an agreed account of justification. So
Alexander Bird
wiley   +1 more source

Is Knowledge a Justified Belief? [PDF]

Pizhūhish/hā-yi Falsafī- Kalāmī
Epistemologists have widely accepted that truth, justification, and belief are necessary conditions for knowledge. This article challenges the necessity of the two components, "belief" and "justification," in the definition of knowledge.
Seyyed Jaaber Mousavirad
doaj   +1 more source

BİLGİ TEORİSİ VE GETTIER PROBLEMİ

Ankara Üniversitesi İlahiyat Fakültesi Dergisi, 1999
Bilgi Teorisi ve Gettier Problemi Bilgi Teorisi ve Gettier Problemi Bilgi Teorisi ve Gettier Problemi Bilgi Teorisi ve Gettier Problemi Bilgi Teorisi ve Gettier Problemi Bilgi Teorisi ve Gettier Problemi Bilgi Teorisi ve Gettier Problemi Bilgi Teorisi ve Gettier Problemi Bilgi Teorisi ve Gettier Problemi Bilgi Teorisi ve Gettier Problemi Bilgi Teorisi ...
openaire   +2 more sources

Unveiling the nature of philosophical problems: Formal and conceptual aspects

Metaphilosophy, Volume 56, Issue 1, Page 17-34, January 2025.
Abstract This paper approximates an intensional definitional distinction between philosophical problems and non‐philosophical problems. It contends that a philosophical problem consists of an inconsistent set M of propositions that satisfies certain characteristics.
Jens Harbecke
wiley   +1 more source