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A Phenomenological Solution to Gettier’s Problem

Logos & Episteme
In “Is Justified True Belief, Knowledge?” Gettier shows us two counter examples of analyzing Knowledge, as “Justified True Belief” or “JTB”. Lots of scholars have reconstructed similar counter examples to JTB but we can see they follow a similar ...
Mohsen Hasannezhad
semanticscholar   +1 more source

Counterfactual Thinking and Thought Experiments [PDF]

, 2014
As part of Timothy Williamson’s inquiry into how we gain knowledge from thought experiments he submits various ways of representing the argument underlying Gettier cases in modal and counterfactual terms.
Turkewitz, Josh
core  

Unreflective epistemology [PDF]

, 2014
Virtue epistemological accounts of knowledge claim that knowledge is a species of a broader normative category, to wit of success from ability. Fake Barn cases pose a difficult problem for such accounts. In structurally analogous but non-epistemic cases,
Kelp, Christoph
core   +1 more source

Mistreating Consent

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Volume 112, Issue 2, Page 544-560, March 2026.
ABSTRACT Consent plays an important role in our lives. Using someone's body or property without their consent is typically a serious wrong. However, there are various ways in which consensual interactions may be morally deficient. This paper articulates an underexplored way in which consent can be defective, namely by being moot.
Elise Woodard
wiley   +1 more source

Preservationism in Memory

Ratio, Volume 39, Issue 1, Page 10-16, March 2026.
ABSTRACT Preservationism in the philosophy of memory is dead, according to many. This opinion is not ill‐founded. It appears to be justified both by common sense and by empirical psychology. But in what follows we explain how and why an independently motivated form of preservationism, modal preservationism, survives.
Sven Bernecker, Paul Silva Jr
wiley   +1 more source

Teaching Students to Understand Knowledge: Stress‐Testing the ‘Justified True Belief Account’ for Critical Thinking

Future in Educational Research, Volume 3, Issue 4, Page 569-579, December 2025.
ABSTRACT This conceptual essay, grounded in a close reading of Plato's Theaetetus, argues that before educators can effectively operationalise critical thinking as the rigorous evaluation ('stress‐testing') of competing knowledge claims, university students must first understand foundational epistemological principles rooted in Plato's tripartite ...
Gerry Dunne
wiley   +1 more source

Implications of Rejecting Common‐Sense Realism for the Practice and Aim of Knowledge‐Based Education

Educational Theory, Volume 75, Issue 6, Page 1107-1129, December 2025.
Abstract In this article, I assume that it is universally accepted that education—at least sometimes—should aim at knowledge. Moreover, I take my point of departure from the classical (and minimal) definition of knowledge in terms of justified true belief (JTB).
Henrik Friberg‐Fernros
wiley   +1 more source

Is Gettier"s First Example Flawed? [PDF]

, 2003
The 'Gettier counterexamples' (Gettier 19631) to the\ud tripartite account of propositional knowledge are generally\ud taken to show that not every instance of justified true belief\ud constitutes knowledge. I argue that Gettier's famous first\ud example
Schmidt-Petri, Christoph
core  

Knowledge first, all the way down

Philosophical Investigations, Volume 48, Issue 4, Page 363-376, October 2025.
Abstract Knowledge‐first philosophy has fewer adherents than it should. It has the potential to address many of the common problems facing epistemologists, but it is counter‐intuitive in some respects. In this paper, I make the case that the underlying metaphysics of Timothy Williamson's account of knowledge‐first is responsible for some of this ...
Tess Dewhurst
wiley   +1 more source

Basing on Absences

Philosophical Issues, Volume 35, Issue 1, Page 29-39, October 2025.
ABSTRACT When what justifies you in believing a proposition is some evidence you have, you are doxastically justified only if you believe that proposition on the basis of that evidence. According to causal theories of basing, this basing relation must be a causal relation.
Juan Comesaña, Carolina Sartorio
wiley   +1 more source