Results 71 to 80 of about 230 (177)
Justified True Belief + Diachronic Justification: A Contemporary Defence
PhilosophiesI defend a diachronic constraint on justification as a necessary condition for knowledge. In my view (JTB + D), a belief is knowledge-apt only if its justification is maintainable over a context-sensitive interval Δ under ordinary avenues of evidence ...
Ahmet Küçükuncular
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Condiciones para saber. (Sobre un artículo de Edmund L. Gettier)
Crítica, 1971 ...
Hugo Padilla
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Stance: an international undergraduate philosophy journal, 2011 This paper examines the causal theory of knowledge put forth by Alvin Goldman in his 1967 paper “A Causal Theory of Knowing.” Goldman contends that a justified, true belief is knowledge if and only ifit is causally connected to the fact that makes it true.
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Biology and Gettier’s Paradox [PDF]
Studia Humana, 2019 Abstract Gettier’s Paradox is considered a most critical problem for the presumably obvious philosophical view that knowledge is justified true belief. Such a view of knowledge, however, exposes the poverty of analytic philosophy. It wrongly assumes, for example, that knowledge must be conscious and explicit, and, to make matters ...
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Knowledge before belief ascription? Yes and no (depending on the type of "knowledge" under consideration). [PDF]
Front Psychol, 2022 Rakoczy H, Proft M.
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Epistemic Value and Fortuitous Truth
Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology, 1997 Why are the conditions for propositional knowledge so difficult to discover or devise in this post-Gettier age? Why do not most epistemologists agree on roughly the same analysis as they appear to have done in the pre-Gettier paradise?
Colin Cheyne
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Evidence, Epistemic Luck, Reliability, and Knowledge. [PDF]
Acta Anal, 2022 Engel M.
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O mito do conhecimento = The myth of knowledge
Veritas, 2016 Em “O Mito do Conhecimento”, Laurence BonJour defende a tese de que a concepção “falibilista” de conhecimento, assumida de modo preponderante pelos epistemólogos na era pós-Gettier, “está errada”, pois tal concepção “fraca” de conhecimento proporciona ...
Bonjour, Laurence +2 more
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Responses to Herman Cappelen and Jennifer Nado. [PDF]
Philos Stud, 2022 Machery E.
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