Results 81 to 90 of about 7,620 (256)

Normal Knowledge: Toward an Explanation-Based Theory of Knowledge [PDF]

, 2018
In this paper we argue that knowledge is characteristically safe true belief. We argue that an adequate approach to epistemic luck must not be indexed to methods of belief formation, but rather to explanations for belief.
Peet, Andrew, Pitcovski, Eli
core   +1 more source

Danger signals for untrustworthy thought experiments

Metaphilosophy, Volume 56, Issue 2, Page 209-224, April 2025.
Abstract A key question in contemporary metaphilosophy of thought experiments is the “wheat from chaff” problem: How can we separate the good and trustworthy thought experiments from the untrustworthy ones? This article examines this problem by viewing thought experimentation as a form of mental simulation.
Henri Tuohimaa
wiley   +1 more source

Putting the horse before the cart: a pragmatist analysis of knowledge

Trans/Form/Ação, 2011
The definition of knowledge as justified true belief is the best we presently have. However, the canonical tripartite analysis of knowledge does not do justice to it due to a Platonic conception of a priori truth that puts the cart before the horse ...
Luís M. Augusto
doaj   +1 more source

Knowledge-First Theories of Justification [PDF]

, 2020
Knowledge-first theories of justification give knowledge priority when it comes to explaining when and why someone has justification for an attitude or an action. The emphasis of this entry is on knowledge-first theories of justification for belief.
Silva, Paul
core  

Epistemic Luck [PDF]

, 2011
Epistemic luck is a generic notion used to describe any of a number of ways in which it can be accidental, coincidental, or fortuitous that a person has a true belief.
Engel Jr, Mylan
core   +1 more source

Evidentialism, justification, and knowledge‐first

Noûs, Volume 59, Issue 1, Page 22-46, March 2025.
Abstract This paper examines the relationship between evidentialism, knowledge‐first epistemology, (E=K) in particular, and justification. Evidentialism gives an account of justified belief in terms of evidence but is silent on the nature of evidence. Knowledge‐first tells us what evidence is but stands in need of an agreed account of justification. So
Alexander Bird
wiley   +1 more source

Respuestas a la crítica de Gettier contra la definición tripartita de conocimiento [PDF]

, 2008
La definición tripartita de conocimiento, también conocida como la caracterización en términos de "creencia verdadera justificada" (en adelante CVJ), ha caído en desgracia desde la publicación del articulo seminal de Gettier: "Is justified True Belief ...
García Duque, Carlos Emilio
core  

Classical invariantism and the puzzle of fallibilism [PDF]

, 2008
This paper revisits a puzzle that arises for theories of knowledge according to which one can know on the basis of merely inductive grounds. No matter how strong such theories require inductive grounds to be if a belief based on them is to qualify as ...
Kelp, Christoph
core   +1 more source

Is Knowledge a Justified Belief? [PDF]

Pizhūhish/hā-yi Falsafī- Kalāmī
Epistemologists have widely accepted that truth, justification, and belief are necessary conditions for knowledge. This article challenges the necessity of the two components, "belief" and "justification," in the definition of knowledge.
Seyyed Jaaber Mousavirad
doaj   +1 more source

Intuition in Contemporary Philosophy [PDF]

, 2014
This chapter will consider three themes relating to the significance of intuitions in contemporary philosophy. In §1, I’ll review and explore the relationship between philosophical use of words like ‘intuitively’ and any kinds of mental states that might
Ichikawa, Jonathan Jenkins
core   +2 more sources