Results 121 to 130 of about 1,001 (166)
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Gibbard's expressivism: An interdisciplinary critical analysis
Philosophical Psychology, 2009This paper examines key aspects of Allan Gibbard's psychological account of moral activity. Inspired by evolutionary theory, Gibbard paints a naturalistic picture of morality mainly based on two specific types of emotion: guilt and anger. His sentimentalist and expressivist analysis is also based on a particular conception of rationality.
Christine Clavien
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Gibbard on Quasi-realism and Global Expressivism
AbstractIn recent work Allan Gibbard claims to be both a local quasi-realist, in Blackburn’s sense, and a global expressivist. His local quasi-realism rests on an argument that for naturalistic discourse but not ethical discourse, the semantic relation of denotation and the causal relation of tracking can and should be identified; that denoting simply ...
Huw Price, Price Huw
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Arrow and Gibbard-Satterthwaite revisited
Mathematical Social Sciences, 1993Abstract This short note offers some insights on Arrow's theorem for social choice functions and the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem on the manipulatibility of voting schemes. At no cost in complexity, it extends these results by exploring the possibility that indifferences be admissible for some pairs of alternatives and not for others: the latter ...
Avraham Beja
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The Gibbard–Satterthwaite theorem: a simple proof
zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.
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The proof of the Gibbard–Satterthwaite theorem revisited [PDF]
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Svensson, Lars-Gunnar +1 more
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Philosophical Studies, 2012
A proof by Allan Gibbard (Ifs: Conditionals, beliefs, decision, chance, time. Reidel, Dordrecht, 1981) seems to demonstrate that if indicative conditionals have truth conditions, they cannot be stronger than material implication. Angelika Kratzer's theory that conditionals do not denote two-place operators purports to escape this result [see Kratzer ...
Justin Khoo, Khoo Justin
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A proof by Allan Gibbard (Ifs: Conditionals, beliefs, decision, chance, time. Reidel, Dordrecht, 1981) seems to demonstrate that if indicative conditionals have truth conditions, they cannot be stronger than material implication. Angelika Kratzer's theory that conditionals do not denote two-place operators purports to escape this result [see Kratzer ...
Justin Khoo, Khoo Justin
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An introduction to Allan Gibbard’s oligarchy theorem paper
Review of Economic Design, 2014zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.
John A Weymark, Weymark John A
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Gibbard on Morality and Sentiment
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 1992Allan Gibbard's book Wise Choices, Apt Feelings is clearly a major philosophical contribution, subtly argued, richly suggestive, yet elegantly and modestly presented. Though primarily focused on "metaethical" issues, questions of natural fact, and methodology, it is also an impressively humane and wise book.
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Another direct proof of the Gibbard–Satterthwaite Theorem
Economics Letters, 2001zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.
Arunava Sen
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Philosophical Issues, 1992
Evaluative judgements fit into all the classical contexts: negation and disjunction as well as conditionals, and when we consider evaluative predicates, quantification as well: Anthony did something wrong, or whenever Anthony does something wrong he also does something right.
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Evaluative judgements fit into all the classical contexts: negation and disjunction as well as conditionals, and when we consider evaluative predicates, quantification as well: Anthony did something wrong, or whenever Anthony does something wrong he also does something right.
openaire +1 more source

