Results 131 to 140 of about 1,001 (166)

Gibbard’s Transcendental Arguments

The Journal of Value Inquiry, 2010
In Thinking How to Live, Allan Gibbard attempts to derive commitments binding on all agents from the logic of planning. In particular, he argues that every agent is committed to the claim that what one ought to do supervenes on prosaic fact. In doing so, he thinks he vindicates much of what moral realists say while giving a more adequate expressivist ...
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Sen’s proofs of the Arrow and Gibbard theorems

Economics Letters, 2017
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Truth, Objectivity, Counterfactuals and Gibbard

Mind, 1997
Adam Morton (1997) challenges me to say more in defence of my claim (1995, p. 295, p. 319; 1991a, pp. 206-7) that the "Gibbard phenomenon" can apply to counterfactuals. He gives reasons for doubting that I am correct. I was brief and inexplicit on this point.
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Another induction proof of the Gibbard–Satterthwaite theorem

Economics Letters, 2009
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A Comment on the Gibbard–Satterthwaite Theorem

The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics
Abstract This paper re-examines the Gibbard–Satterthwaite theorem when some anomalous choice functions are allowed. We show non-dictatorial social aggregators that limit manipulation and non-dictatorial social aggregators do not permit manipulation.
Daniel Sandroni, Alvaro Sandroni
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Allan Gibbard

2021
Matthew D. Adler, John A. Weymark
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Another direct proof for the Gibbard–Satterthwaite Theorem

Economics Letters, 2012
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Gibbard’s Offer to Non-Naturalists

2017
This chapter discusses the claim that, if it were true that we ought to do something just when this act would maximize net pleasure, the concepts ought and would maximize net pleasure would refer to the same property. If these properties were one and the same, that would both tell us what we ought to do and explain why we ought to do these things.
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Gibbard’s Resolution of Our Disagreements

2017
This chapter investigates a wider, non-realist cognitivist form. In this view, our normative concepts and claims cannot be defined or restated in naturalistic terms. As non-naturalists believe, these concepts and claims are irreducibly normative. According to metaphysical non-naturalists, these claims imply that there exist some ontologically weighty ...
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Norms and Negation: A Problem for Gibbard's Logic

The Philosophical Quarterly, 2001
All expressivist theories, including Gibbard's norm-expressivism, require a solution to the ‘Frege–Geach problem’, or ‘embedding problem’. This is the problem of accounting for the fact that normative predicates can enter into indefinitely many complex contexts without changing their meanings. I argue that Gibbard's well known solution fails. The chief
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