Results 221 to 230 of about 9,862 (261)
Some of the next articles are maybe not open access.
Bidding for incentive contracts
Journal of Mathematical Economics, 2017zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.
Julien, Benoit, Roger, Guillaume
openaire +3 more sources
, 1987 Labor relations involve incentive problems. The market solves these problems by developing a variety of institutions. This paper describes and assesses the various forms of incentive contracts.
openaire +1 more source
The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1980
SUMMARY This paper analyzes the widely used "incentive contract"-a linear payment schedule where the buyer pays a fixed fee plus some proportion of project cost. The remaining proportion of project cost borne by the seller is usually called the "sharing ratio." A higher sharing ratio creates more incentive to reduce costs.
openaire +1 more source
SUMMARY This paper analyzes the widely used "incentive contract"-a linear payment schedule where the buyer pays a fixed fee plus some proportion of project cost. The remaining proportion of project cost borne by the seller is usually called the "sharing ratio." A higher sharing ratio creates more incentive to reduce costs.
openaire +1 more source
LIQUIDITY CONSTRAINTS AND INCENTIVE CONTRACTS
Macroeconomic Dynamics, 1999Are firms and households constrained in the use of a productive input? Theoretical approaches to this question range from exogenously imposed credit allocation rules to endogenous market failures stemming from some sort of limited-commitment or moral-hazard problem.
Lehnert, Andreas +2 more
openaire +2 more sources
An Incentive Contract With Asymmetric Information
International Economic Journal, 2000This Paper considers the problem of designing an optimal incentive contract between a retailer and a manufacturer when the former has private information about demand and its own cost. Based on a multi-period framework, we show that the incentive franchise contract can bring about the fist-best outcome of vertical integration when the retailer has ...
Jung, CY Jung Choong-Young +2 more
openaire +1 more source
Calibrated Incentive Contracts
Econometrica, 2011Summary: This paper studies a dynamic agency problem which includes limited liability, moral hazard, and adverse selection. The paper develops a robust approach to dynamic contracting based on calibrating the incentive properties of simple benchmark contracts that are attractive but infeasible, due to limited liability constraints.
openaire +2 more sources
Incentive Contract and Weather Risk
Environmental and Resource Economics, 2006We study contracts designed to remunerate a farmer for the production of an ecosystem service with the payment dependent on the results of the farmer’s actions and on weather conditions. Two contracts are proposed: the first takes into account both the results of the farmer’s actions and a weather variable that reflects the actual atmospheric ...
Loisel, Patrice, Elyakime, Bernard
openaire +2 more sources
Uncertainty in Procurement Contracting with Time Incentives
SSRN Electronic Journal, 2020AbstractThis article studies cost‐plus‐time (A+B) procurement contracting with time incentives in the highway construction industry. In the presence of construction uncertainty, the contractor's actual completion time may deviate from the bid completion time, and the A+B contract design is not ex post efficient.
Gao, Wenzheng +2 more
openaire +1 more source
Hierarchical Decentralization of Incentive Contracts
The RAND Journal of Economics, 1995Agents in a hierarchy are commonly delegated authority to communicate and contract with agents at lower levels. While delegation reduces the burden of communication and information processing on the principal, it also introduces additional incentive problems.
Nahum D. Melumad +2 more
openaire +2 more sources
Incentive Contracts in Utility Regulation
Revue d'économie industrielle, 2000Ce papier retrace le développement des contrats incitatifs dans la réglementation des industries de service public et les défis rencontrés, comme l'a illustré l'expérience britannique. Nous nous demandons tout d'abord pourquoi une réglementation est nécessaire et nous examinons la réglementation dans un cadre simple de Principal/Agent.
Bennett, Matthew +1 more
openaire +2 more sources