Results 231 to 240 of about 9,862 (261)

Performance standards in incentive contracts

Journal of Accounting and Economics, 1999
Abstract Research in incentives has focused on performance measures and pay-performance sensitivities but has largely ignored the “performance standard”, which generates important incentives whenever plan participants can influence the standard-setting process.
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Voluntary ambiguity in incentive contracts

OR Spectrum, 2013
zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.
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Bonuses and Penalties in Incentive Contracting

The Bell Journal of Economics, 1980
Moral hazard in risk-sharing agreements often occurs when an agent's actions cannot be observed directly. We consider the case in which there is some observable measure of the agent's performance that varies continuously with the agent's effort. We analyze contracts that allow for lump-sum bonus and penalty payments contingent on performance and ...
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Incentives for Contract Designers

SSRN Electronic Journal, 2021
This paper examines the optimal provision of incentives for contract designers. A principal hires an agent to draft a contract that is incomplete because the ex-ante specified design might not be appropriate ex-post. The degree of contract incompleteness is endogenously determined by the effort exerted by the agent, who can manipulate the principal's ...
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Incentive Contracts in Logistics Outsourcing

2013
Recent development in logistics has led to wide use of external service providers. This paper aims to apply the agency theory to study the cooperative relationship between outsourcing enterprise and their logistics service providers through the use of incentive contracts.
Qin Zhu, Richard Y. K. Fung
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Incentive Contracts and Performance Measurement

Journal of Political Economy, 1992
This paper examines the characteristics of incentive contracts in which the agent's payoff is not based on the principal's objective. I show that contracts based on such performance measures will not in general provide first-best incentives, even when the agent is risk neutral. The form of the optimal contract and the efficiency of this contract depend
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Dynamic Incentives in Relational Incentive Contracts

SSRN Electronic Journal, 2017
This paper studies relational incentive contracts with persistent states in the presence of both moral hazard and information asymmetry. The optimal contracts are dynamic in which the agents are rewarded following a high output by moving to a higher continuation payoff in the next period.
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The determinants of faculty pay in Russian universities: incentive contracts

European Journal of Higher Education, 2021
Ilya Prakhov, VÍCTOR Rudakov
exaly  

Estimating Effects of Incentive Contracts in Online Labor Platforms

Management Science, 2023
Auyon Siddiq
exaly  

Incentive Contracts

2021
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