Results 111 to 120 of about 153 (145)
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Thought: A Journal of Philosophy, 2022
P. van Inwagen famously offered three precise versions of the so-called Consequence Argument for incompatibilism. The third of these essentially employs the notion of an agent’s having a choice with respect to a proposition. In this paper, I offer two intuitively attractive accounts of this notion in terms of the explanatory connective ‘because’ and ...
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P. van Inwagen famously offered three precise versions of the so-called Consequence Argument for incompatibilism. The third of these essentially employs the notion of an agent’s having a choice with respect to a proposition. In this paper, I offer two intuitively attractive accounts of this notion in terms of the explanatory connective ‘because’ and ...
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Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 2013
The consequence argument attempts to show that incompatibilism is true by showing that if there is determinism, then we never had, have or will have any choice about anything. Much of the debate on the consequence argument has focused on the “beta” transfer principle, and its improvements.
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The consequence argument attempts to show that incompatibilism is true by showing that if there is determinism, then we never had, have or will have any choice about anything. Much of the debate on the consequence argument has focused on the “beta” transfer principle, and its improvements.
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Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 2006
Incompatibilists believe free will is impossible if determinism is true, and they often claim that this view is supported by ordinary intuitions. We challenge the claim that incompatibilism is intuitive to most laypersons and discuss the significance of this challenge to the free will debate. After explaining why incompatibilists should want their view
Eddy Nahmias +3 more
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Incompatibilists believe free will is impossible if determinism is true, and they often claim that this view is supported by ordinary intuitions. We challenge the claim that incompatibilism is intuitive to most laypersons and discuss the significance of this challenge to the free will debate. After explaining why incompatibilists should want their view
Eddy Nahmias +3 more
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2003
AbstractA basic characterization of free will is offered, and common beliefs about the value of free will are reviewed. Two incompatibilist theses are distinguished: broad incompatibilism holds that both free will and moral responsibility are incompatible with determinism, while merely narrow incompatibilism holds that free will requires indeterminism ...
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AbstractA basic characterization of free will is offered, and common beliefs about the value of free will are reviewed. Two incompatibilist theses are distinguished: broad incompatibilism holds that both free will and moral responsibility are incompatible with determinism, while merely narrow incompatibilism holds that free will requires indeterminism ...
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Incompatibilism and Prudential Obligation
Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 2010Take determinism to be the thesis that for any instant, there is exactly one physically possible future (van Inwagen 1983, 3), and understand incompatibilism regarding responsibility to be the view that determinism is incompatible with moral responsibility.
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Defending Direct Source Incompatibilism
Acta Analytica, 2011Joseph Keim Campbell has attempted to say “farewell” to a particular version of source incompatibilism, viz. direct source incompatibilism, arguing that direct source incompatibilism is committed to two theses that are in tension, thereby threatening the coherence of the position.
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Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 2012
AbstractThere is a new objection to the Consequence Argument for incompatibilism. I argue that the objection is more wide‐ranging than originally thought. In particular: if it tells against the Consequence Argument, it tells against other arguments for incompatibilism too. I survey a few ways of dealing with this objection and show the costs of each. I
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AbstractThere is a new objection to the Consequence Argument for incompatibilism. I argue that the objection is more wide‐ranging than originally thought. In particular: if it tells against the Consequence Argument, it tells against other arguments for incompatibilism too. I survey a few ways of dealing with this objection and show the costs of each. I
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Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 2002
1. According to R. J. Wallace in Responsibility and the Moral Sentiments, when we ask whether X is morally responsible for some bad act A, we are asking whether X is blameworthy for A. And when we ask whether X is blameworthy for doing A, we are asking whether it would be morally fair to blame him for it.
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1. According to R. J. Wallace in Responsibility and the Moral Sentiments, when we ask whether X is morally responsible for some bad act A, we are asking whether X is blameworthy for A. And when we ask whether X is blameworthy for doing A, we are asking whether it would be morally fair to blame him for it.
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How Not to Argue for Incompatibilism
Erkenntnis, 2004zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.
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Reasons, Causes, and Chance-Incompatibilism
Philosophia, 2016Libertarianism appears to be incoherent, because free will appears to be incompatible with indeterminism. In support of this claim, van Inwagen offered an argument that is now known as the “rollback argument”. In a recent reply, Lara Buchak has argued that the underlying thought experiment fails to support the first of two key premises.
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