Results 151 to 160 of about 2,545 (184)
Ishtiyaque Haji, Incompatibilism's Allure: Principal Arguments for Incompatibilism.
The Philosophical Review, 2010 Stephen Kearns
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Mind, 1984
In an early and famous essay on freedom A. J. Ayer attributed our fear of determinism partly to the half-conscious survival of an animistic conception of causality, in which an unhappy effect tries 'vainly to escape from the clutches of an overmastering cause'. ' The general argument was this.
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In an early and famous essay on freedom A. J. Ayer attributed our fear of determinism partly to the half-conscious survival of an animistic conception of causality, in which an unhappy effect tries 'vainly to escape from the clutches of an overmastering cause'. ' The general argument was this.
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Incompatibilism and Prudential Obligation
Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 2010Take determinism to be the thesis that for any instant, there is exactly one physically possible future (van Inwagen 1983, 3), and understand incompatibilism regarding responsibility to be the view that determinism is incompatible with moral responsibility.
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Defending Direct Source Incompatibilism
Acta Analytica, 2011Joseph Keim Campbell has attempted to say “farewell” to a particular version of source incompatibilism, viz. direct source incompatibilism, arguing that direct source incompatibilism is committed to two theses that are in tension, thereby threatening the coherence of the position.
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Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 2012
AbstractThere is a new objection to the Consequence Argument for incompatibilism. I argue that the objection is more wide‐ranging than originally thought. In particular: if it tells against the Consequence Argument, it tells against other arguments for incompatibilism too. I survey a few ways of dealing with this objection and show the costs of each. I
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AbstractThere is a new objection to the Consequence Argument for incompatibilism. I argue that the objection is more wide‐ranging than originally thought. In particular: if it tells against the Consequence Argument, it tells against other arguments for incompatibilism too. I survey a few ways of dealing with this objection and show the costs of each. I
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Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 2002
1. According to R. J. Wallace in Responsibility and the Moral Sentiments, when we ask whether X is morally responsible for some bad act A, we are asking whether X is blameworthy for A. And when we ask whether X is blameworthy for doing A, we are asking whether it would be morally fair to blame him for it.
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1. According to R. J. Wallace in Responsibility and the Moral Sentiments, when we ask whether X is morally responsible for some bad act A, we are asking whether X is blameworthy for A. And when we ask whether X is blameworthy for doing A, we are asking whether it would be morally fair to blame him for it.
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Reasons, Causes, and Chance-Incompatibilism
Philosophia, 2016Libertarianism appears to be incoherent, because free will appears to be incompatible with indeterminism. In support of this claim, van Inwagen offered an argument that is now known as the “rollback argument”. In a recent reply, Lara Buchak has argued that the underlying thought experiment fails to support the first of two key premises.
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Hard incompatibilism and its rivals
Philosophical Studies, 2009In this article I develop several responses to my co-authors of Four Views on Free Will. In reply to Manuel Vargas, I suggest a way to clarify his claim that our concepts of free will and moral responsibility should be revised, and I question whether he really proposes to revise the notion of basic desert at stake in the debate.
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