Results 41 to 50 of about 173 (155)

Slow switching and the psychology of memory

open access: yesMind &Language, Volume 41, Issue 3, Page 383-401, June 2026.
This article presents elements of a theory of the representational contents of episodic memory and a new perspective on the relationship between memory and self‐knowledge. These two interrelated outcomes fall out of a novel naturalistic treatment of the debate concerning the compatibility between semantic externalism and a priori self‐knowledge.
Jay Richardson
wiley   +1 more source

Can Soft‐Line Compatibilism Handle Eternally Recurrent Manipulation?

open access: yesTheoria, Volume 92, Issue 2, April 2026.
ABSTRACT A key challenge to compatibilism comes from manipulation arguments. These argue that agents whose actions are manipulated are not morally responsible and that manipulation is not relevantly different from determinism. One common response from compatibilists is to claim that there is a relevant difference between manipulation and ordinary ...
James Andow
wiley   +1 more source

On ‘the Central Argument’ of ‘Freedom and Resentment’: Hieronymi, Russell, and Strawson

open access: yesTheoria, Volume 92, Issue 1, February 2026.
ABSTRACT P. F. Strawson's 1962 essay ‘Freedom and Resentment’ has been enormously influential for the contemporary responsibility discussion. It nevertheless remains contested how the essay is to be understood, and what the central argument is, if there even is any such.
Anton Emilsson
wiley   +1 more source

Free will, quarantines, and moral enhancements: neuroabolitionism as an alternative to criminal law

open access: yesFrontiers in Sociology
This article critically navigates the complex debate surrounding free will and criminal justice, challenging traditional assumptions of moral responsibility and culpability.
Diego Borbón
doaj   +1 more source

Free Will, Compatibilism, and Incompatibilism. A Dialogue with Daniel Dennett

open access: yesRivista Internazionale di Filosofia e Psicologia, 2017
Editor's ...
Sandro Nannini
doaj   +1 more source

Scientific or naïve? Perceptions of direct and indirect realism, and why they matter

open access: yesPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research, Volume 112, Issue 1, Page 102-129, January 2026.
Abstract Philosophical debates about the nature of perception are standardly informed by an empirical assumption about folk beliefs: They assume there is such a thing as “the” common‐sense conception of vision, and that this conception is captured by Direct Realism.
Eugen Fischer   +2 more
wiley   +1 more source

Love imperiled

open access: yesEuropean Journal of Analytic Philosophy, 2007
In this paper, we argue that hard incompatibilism imperils a typical component of loving relations —lovable behavior—if it imperils moral praiseworthiness.
Ishtiyaque Haji, Stefaan E. Cuypers
doaj  

The bayesian and the abductivist

open access: yesNoûs, Volume 59, Issue 4, Page 921-937, December 2025.
Abstract A major open question in the borderlands between epistemology and philosophy of science concerns whether Bayesian updating and abductive inference are compatible. Some philosophers—most influentially Bas van Fraassen—have argued that they are not.
Mattias Skipper, Olav Benjamin Vassend
wiley   +1 more source

Two intuitions about free will—Some afterthoughts

open access: yesTheoria, Volume 91, Issue 2, April 2025.
Abstract In 2014, Christian List and I published a paper that delineated our view regarding what it takes for an agent to act freely. We suggested that this requires the action to be endorsed by the agent and caused by this endorsement and yet not be necessitated.
Wlodek Rabinowicz
wiley   +1 more source

Reflections on Sam Harris' "Free Will"

open access: yesRivista Internazionale di Filosofia e Psicologia, 2017
In his book Free Will Sam Harris tries to persuade us to abandon the morally pernicious idea of free will. The following contribution articulates and defends a more sophisticated model of free will that is not only consistent with neuroscience and ...
Daniel C. Dennett
doaj   +1 more source

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