Results 41 to 48 of about 82,380 (48)

Bargaining over Treatment Choice under Disagreement

American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 2023
A group of experts with different prior beliefs must choose a treatment. A dataset is made public and leads to revisions of beliefs. We propose a model where the experts’ disagreements are resolved through bargaining, using the Nash bargaining solution ...
Nabil I. Al-Najjar, Robert J. Gary-Bobo
semanticscholar   +1 more source

On Optimal Scheduling

American Economic Journal: Microeconomics
We consider a decision-maker sequentially choosing among alternatives when periodic payoffs depend on both chosen and unchosen alternatives in that period.
K. Eliaz, Daniel Fershtman, A. Frug
semanticscholar   +1 more source

Decentralized Matching with Transfers: Experimental and Noncooperative Analyses

American Economic Journal: Microeconomics
We experimentally examine the Becker-Shapley-Shubik two-sided matching model. In the experiment, the aggregate outcomes of matching and surplus are affected by whether equal split is in the core and whether efficient matching is assortative; the ...
Simin He, Jiabin Wu, Hanzhe Zhang, Xun Zhu   +3 more
semanticscholar   +1 more source

Limited Strategic Thinking and the Cursed Match

American Economic Journal: Microeconomics
In vertically differentiated matching markets with private information, agents face an acceptance curse: being accepted as a partner conveys bad news.
Olivier Bochet, Jacopo Magnani
semanticscholar   +1 more source

De quoi l’homogamie économique est-elle le signe ? Une application à l’Allemagne de l’Ouest

Revue économique
L’homogamie économique est un phénomène largement documenté, qui est souvent interprété comme résultant d’une préférence pour l’entre-soi. Pourtant, les caractéristiques des conjoints dans un ménage conditionnent non seulement leur satisfaction à être ...
Marion Goussé, Nicolas Jacquemet, J. Robin   +2 more
semanticscholar   +1 more source

Noise-Tolerant Community Enforcement and the Strength of Small Stakes

American Economic Review: Insights
We study community enforcement in a large population with noisy monitoring. We focus on equilibria in the prisoner’s dilemma that are coordination proof, meaning that matched partners never play a Pareto-dominated Nash equilibrium in the one-shot game ...
D. Fudenberg, A. Wolitzky
semanticscholar   +1 more source

Standard Setting Committees: Consensus Governance for Shared Technology Platforms

, 2012
Timothy S. Simcoe
semanticscholar   +1 more source

Relational Contracts and the Value of Relationships

, 2012
Marina Halac
semanticscholar   +1 more source