Results 21 to 30 of about 82,380 (48)
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The American Economic Review, 2023
I study ultimatum bargaining with imperfectly observed offers. Imperfectly observed offers must be rejected with positive probability, even when the players’ preferences are common knowledge. Noisier observations imply a greater risk of rejection.
A. Wolitzky
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I study ultimatum bargaining with imperfectly observed offers. Imperfectly observed offers must be rejected with positive probability, even when the players’ preferences are common knowledge. Noisier observations imply a greater risk of rejection.
A. Wolitzky
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Efficient Matching in the School Choice Problem
The American Economic Review, 2022Stable matchings in school choice needn’t be Pareto efficient and can leave thousands of students worse off than necessary. Call a matching μ priority-neutral if no matching can make any student whose priority is violated by μ better off without ...
P. Reny
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The Doors of Perception: Theory and Evidence of Frame-Dependent Rationalizability
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 2023We investigate how strategic behavior is affected by the set of notions (frames) used when thinking about the game. In our games the action set consists of visual objects: each player must privately choose one, trying to match the counterpart’s choice ...
G. Charness, Alessandro Sontuoso
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Stable and Efficient Resource Allocation with Contracts
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 2023Consider indivisible-object allocation with contracts, such as college admissions, where contracts specify majors. Can a designer guarantee a stable and (student) efficient matching? I show that contracts put stability and efficiency at odds; a necessary
Bobak Pakzad-Hurson
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Strategic network formation with many agents
Journal of EconometricsWe consider a random utility model of strategic network formation, where we derive a tractable approximation to the distribution of network links using many-player asymptotics.
Konrad Menzel
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Simple Manipulations in School Choice Mechanisms
American Economic Journal: MicroeconomicsMarket design mechanisms are often required to be strategy proof, ensuring that no misreporting is profitable. This, however, may be overly restrictive: Real-world participants may be unable to engage in complex misreporting.
Ryoji Shirakawa
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Commitment and Conflict in Unanimity Bargaining
American Economic Journal: MicroeconomicsWe theoretically investigate how the application of unanimity rule can lead to inefficient delay in collective decision-making. We do so in the context of a distributive multilateral bargaining model featuring strategic precommitment.
Topi Miettinen, C. Vanberg
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Non-manipulable house exchange under (minimum) equilibrium prices
Games Econ. Behav.We consider a market with indivisible objects, called houses, and money. On this market, each house is initially owned (or rented) by some agent and each agent demands precisely one house.
Lars-Gunnar Svensson +2 more
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Bargaining under liquidity constraints: Experimental evidence
Journal of Economics TheoryBargaining is widely used in monetary, labor and finance models to determine terms of trade. The chosen bargaining solution can matter for welfare analysis, for example when agents are liquidity constrained.
J. Duffy, Lucie Lebeau, D. Puzzello
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Bargaining and Information Acquisition
American Economic Journal: MicroeconomicsWe consider an ultimatum game where the value of the object being sold to the buyer is high or low. The seller knows the value, but the buyer does not. The value to the seller is zero.
Kalyan Chatterjee +2 more
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