Results 11 to 20 of about 82,380 (48)
Robust Minimal Instability of the Top Trading Cycles Mechanism
Social Science Research Network, 2020 In the context of priority-based allocation of objects, we formulate methods to compare assignments in terms of their stability. We introduce three basic properties that a reasonable stability comparison should satisfy.
Battal Doğan, Lars Ehlers
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Stakes Matter in Ultimatum Games
, 2011 One of the most robust findings in experimental economics is that individuals in one-shot ultimatum games reject unfair offers. Puzzlingly, rejections have been found robust to substantial increases in stakes.
Steffen Andersen +4 more
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Cream Skimming and Information Design in Matching Markets
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 2019 Short-lived buyers arrive to a platform over time and randomly match with sellers. The sellers stay at the platform and decide whether to accept incoming requests.
Gleb Romanyuk, Alex Smolin
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, 2011 In Fall 2009, Chicago authorities abandoned a school assignment mechanism midstream, citing concerns about its vulnerability to manipulation. Nonetheless, they asked thousands of applicants to re-rank schools in a new mechanism that is also manipulable ...
Parag A. Pathak, Tayfun Sönmez
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Capital Tax Reform and the Real Economy: The Effects of the 2003 Dividend Tax Cut
, 2015 Danny Yagan
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Designing Random Allocation Mechanisms: Theory and Applications
, 2013 Eric Budish +3 more
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Price Discrimination and Bargaining: Empirical Evidence from Medical Devices
, 2013 Matthew Grennan
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Diagnosing Hospital System Bargaining Power in Managed Care Networks
, 2015 Matthew S. Lewis, Kevin E. Pflum
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A Theory of Stability in Matching with Incomplete Information
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 2023We provide a framework for studying two-sided matching markets with incomplete information. The framework accommodates two-sided incomplete information as well as heterogeneous information among the agents.
Yi-Chun Chen, Gaoji Hu
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Incomplete Information Bargaining with Applications to Mergers, Investment, and Vertical Integration
The American Economic Review, 2022We provide an incomplete information bargaining framework that captures the effects of differential bargaining power in markets with multiple buyers and multiple suppliers. The market is modeled as a mechanism that maximizes the expected weighted welfare
S. Loertscher, L. Marx
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