Results 31 to 40 of about 82,380 (48)
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Ultimatum Bargaining with Rational Inattention
The American Economic Review, 2020A seller bargains with a rationally inattentive buyer (Sims 2003) over a good of random quality. After observing quality, the seller makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer.
Doron Ravid
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Unraveling and Inefficient Matching
American Economic Journal: MicroeconomicsLabor markets unravel when workers and firms match inefficiently early under limited information. I argue that a significant determinant of unraveling is the presence of a secondary market, where firms can poach workers, and its transparency: how well ...
Akhil Vohra
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Strategyproof and budget-balanced mechanisms for assembly
Operations Research LettersAssembly is an exchange problem with one buyer and multiple sellers. The buyer wants to purchase multiple items and sellers hold one item each. In applications like land acquisition, the buyer is required to purchase contiguous land plots to realize a ...
Soumendu Sarkar
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Social Science Research Network, 2023
Complementarities and peer effects are common in matching markets, yet incorporating them often leads to nonexistence of stable matchings. We observe that matching is often an ongoing process rather than a static allocation, where long-lived firms ...
Ce Liu, Ziwei Wang, Hanzhe Zhang
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Complementarities and peer effects are common in matching markets, yet incorporating them often leads to nonexistence of stable matchings. We observe that matching is often an ongoing process rather than a static allocation, where long-lived firms ...
Ce Liu, Ziwei Wang, Hanzhe Zhang
semanticscholar +1 more source
American Economic Review: Insights
We study whether the Coase conjecture holds for bargaining during war. Two players, A and B, contest a divisible resource until one side collapses or agreement is reached.
Sandeep Baliga, Tomas Sjöström
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We study whether the Coase conjecture holds for bargaining during war. Two players, A and B, contest a divisible resource until one side collapses or agreement is reached.
Sandeep Baliga, Tomas Sjöström
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Dynamic Matching in Overloaded Waiting Lists
The American Economic Review, 2019This paper introduces a stylized model to capture distinctive features of waiting list allocation mechanisms. First, agents choose among items with associated expected wait times. Waiting times serve a similar role to that of monetary prices in directing
Jacob D. Leshno
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What You Don’t Know May Be Good for You
The American Economic ReviewWe consider an economy in which long-lived experts are matched with short-lived clients. Experts choose the type of client with whom they match, unobserved by the market. The interaction outcome depends on both the expert’s and the client’s type.
Johannes Hörner, Larry Samuelson
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American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 2022
We study a model of two-sided search in which agents’ strategic reasoning is coarse. In equilibrium, the most desirable agents behave as if they were fully rational, while for all other agents, coarse reasoning results in overoptimism with regard to ...
Yair Antler, Benjamin Bachi
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We study a model of two-sided search in which agents’ strategic reasoning is coarse. In equilibrium, the most desirable agents behave as if they were fully rational, while for all other agents, coarse reasoning results in overoptimism with regard to ...
Yair Antler, Benjamin Bachi
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MaxJoint or MinDiff? The Efficiency–Fairness Trade-off Among Joint Decision Rules in Negotiations
Journal of Interdisciplinary EconomicsJointly made decisions are a common feature across economic and social systems. Various decision rules can be used to identify a jointly negotiated offer.
Zachary A. Collier
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The American Economic Review, 2020
We study a bargaining model in which a buyer makes frequent offers to a privately informed seller, while gradually learning about the seller’s type from “news.” We show that the buyer’s ability to leverage this information to extract more surplus from ...
Brendan Daley, Brett Green
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We study a bargaining model in which a buyer makes frequent offers to a privately informed seller, while gradually learning about the seller’s type from “news.” We show that the buyer’s ability to leverage this information to extract more surplus from ...
Brendan Daley, Brett Green
semanticscholar +1 more source