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Incentive Contracts and Institutional Labor Market Design
SSRN Electronic Journal, 2011This paper analyzes a labor market, where firms offer workers incentive contracts and make decisions about irreversible capital investments. The state authority regulates the institutional framework by choosing the level of unemployment benefits and the workers' bargaining power. Our results suggest that unemployment benefits reduce workers' incentives
Martina Nikolaeva Gogova +1 more
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Labor Market: Incentives, Wages and Contracts
2016Prendergast (1999) begins his widely known survey of incentives of the firm with the sentence “incentives are the essence of the economy.” Hardly any economist would disagree with the idea that economic agents react to the incentives they face, even more so if a significant number of individuals have motivations beyond their own self interest and have ...
Enrique Fatas, Antonio J. Morales
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Contracts, Job Experience, and Cyclical Labor Market Adjustments
Journal of Labor Economics, 1983Longitudinal estimates of the variability of individual wages, hours, and weeks worked over the course of changing demand states are provided for all workers generally and for workers of varied levels of job experience. Emphasis is placed on that part of job experience represented as years on current job, a commonly used proxy for the magnitude of firm-
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Crime and the Labor Market: A Search Model with Optimal Contracts
SSRN Electronic Journal, 2007Abstract This paper extends the Pissarides [Pissarides, Christopher A. Equilibrium Unemployment Theory. Cambridge: MIT (2000)] model of the labor market to include crime and punishment a la Becker [Becker, Gary S. “Crime and punishment: an economic approach.” Journal of Political Economy 76 (1968): 169–217].
Bryan Engelhardt +2 more
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Oligopsonistic Landlords, Segmented Labor Markets, and the Persistence of Tied‐Labor Contracts
American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 2002AbstractThis article examines contractual labor arrangements in agrarian economies that persist as a consequence of market power on the part of landlords faced with output uncertainty. We show that a segmented labor market characterized by tied‐labor contracts and involuntary unemployment in the lean season are optimal as compared to a labor hiring ...
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Temporary Contracts and Work—Family Balance in a Dual Labor Market
ILR Review, 2013A well-established finding in the literature is that self-employment enables mothers to accommodate work and family needs better than when they are engaged in organizational employment. With this result in mind, the authors investigate within a dual system of job protection if women under temporary contracts face greater work-family conflicts than ...
Rocio Bonet +3 more
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Journal of Labor Economics, 2010
This paper addresses Alvin Roth’s findings of market contracting at times earlier than optimal for market participants, which Roth describes as market “unraveling,” a market failure he proposes to solve by designing centralized buyer‐seller matching programs. This paper shows that, while Roth’s engineering solutions are ingenious, the early contracting
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This paper addresses Alvin Roth’s findings of market contracting at times earlier than optimal for market participants, which Roth describes as market “unraveling,” a market failure he proposes to solve by designing centralized buyer‐seller matching programs. This paper shows that, while Roth’s engineering solutions are ingenious, the early contracting
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Unemployment and Labor–market Reform: A Contract Theoretic Approach
The Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 2002Why do many democracies fail to reform their labor–market institutions? To answer this question we study the feasibility of reforms that include compensation to insiders for the removal of labor–market regulations. Under asymmetric information, a reformer who wants to buy the approval of voters has to pay them an informational rent in addition to the ...
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Fixed-Term Contracts and Labor Market Duality in France
De Economist, 2018The French labor market is segmented between permanent and temporary workers. The second category has difficulty in getting an open-ended contract. This paper aims at depicting workers on short-term contracts and shows the consequences on their professional career are negative and significant.
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Labor-Market Implications of Contracts under Moral Hazard [PDF]
, 2007 The optimal contract under moral hazard is embedded in a standard Mortensen-Pissarides matching model. Under standard assumptions, we show that when firms cannot perfectly observe workers' productivity the optimal contract can take the form of a debt contract exhibiting almost a fixed wage along the business cycle. When this contract is embedded in the
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