Results 21 to 30 of about 6,610 (242)

Evaluating Leniency with Missing Information on Undetected Cartels: Exploring Time-Varying Policy Impacts on Cartel Duration [PDF]

open access: yes, 2011
This paper examines the effects of European Commission’s (EC) new leniency program on the EC’s capabilities in detecting and deterring cartels. As a supplementary analysis, the US leniency is studied.
Zhou, Jun
core   +1 more source

Collecting Evidence Through Access to Competition Authorities’ Files – Interplay or Potential Conflicts Between Private and Public Enforcement Proceedings? [PDF]

open access: yesYearbook of Antitrust and Regulatory Studies, 2015
Information asymmetry between claimants seeking damages for competition law violations and the alleged infringing undertaking(s) is a key problem in the development of private antitrust enforcement because it often prevents successful actions for damages.
Anna Gulińska
doaj   +1 more source

The leniency agreement: ananalysis of constitutional compatibility and legitimacy

open access: yesRevista do Direito Público, 2015
The scope of this study is to analyze the institution of the Leniency Agreement, notably under the light of theAnticorruption Law provision (Law 12.846 of 2013)and theRegulatory Decree 8.420 of 2015.
Marlon roberth sales   +1 more
doaj   +1 more source

Organizational leniency: examining the consequences of ignoring performance problems in public organizations [PDF]

open access: yesRevista de Administração Pública
Organizational leniency, defined as management’s systematic failure to address performance problems (such as low productivity, poor quality of work, absenteeism, etc.), is often a reality in public organizations.
Gustavo M. Tavares   +2 more
doaj   +1 more source

Leniency – the Polish Programme and the ‘Semi-formal’ Harmonisation in the EU by the European Competition Network [PDF]

open access: yesYearbook of Antitrust and Regulatory Studies, 2015
When studying the legal character of the Polish leniency programme, one cannot overlook its origin and the harmonisation process of such programmes in the EU.
Marcin Kulesza
doaj  

THE MODEL OF CRIMINAL ACTIVITY AND EFFECTIVE CARTEL DETERRENCE

open access: yesEkonomika, 2014
Cartels, or secret agreements between competitors, are universally recognized as the most harmful of all types of anticompetitive conduct. Facing the challenges associated with globalization of the market economy, competition authorities in all parts of ...
Danguolė Klimašauskienė
doaj   +1 more source

Leniency Programs and Cartel Prosecution [PDF]

open access: yesSSRN Electronic Journal, 1999
We study the enforcement of competition policy against collusion under Leniency Programs, which give reduced fines to firms revealing information to the Antitrust Authority. Such programs give firms an incentive to break collusion, but may also have a pro-collusive effect, since they decrease the expected cost of misbehaviour.
MOTTA M., POLO, MICHELE
openaire   +6 more sources

The Impact of EU Law on a National Competition Authority’s Leniency Programme – the Case of Poland [PDF]

open access: yesYearbook of Antitrust and Regulatory Studies, 2014
This paper is devoted to the impact of EU law on national leniency programmes, especially the Polish one. It analyses the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice in Pfleiderer, Donau Chemie and Schenker and identifies three specific areas of potential EU ...
Piotr Sitarek
doaj  

Leniency policies and illegal transactions [PDF]

open access: yesJournal of Public Economics, 2006
Forthcoming in the Journal of Public Economics. We study the consequences of leniency - reduced legal sanctions for wrongdoers who spontaneously self-report to law enforcers - on sequential, bilateral, illegal transactions, such as corruption, manager-auditor collusion, or drug deals.
Buccirossi, P, SPAGNOLO, GIANCARLO
openaire   +5 more sources

The Effects of Leniency on Cartel Pricing [PDF]

open access: yesThe B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, 2014
AbstractWe analyze how leniency affects cartel pricing in an infinitely repeated oligopoly model where the fine rates are linked to illegal gains and detection probabilities depend on the degree of collusion. A novel aspect of this study is that we focus on the worst possible outcome. We investigate the maximal cartel price, the largest price for which
Harold Houba   +2 more
openaire   +6 more sources

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