Evaluating Leniency with Missing Information on Undetected Cartels: Exploring Time-Varying Policy Impacts on Cartel Duration [PDF]
This paper examines the effects of European Commission’s (EC) new leniency program on the EC’s capabilities in detecting and deterring cartels. As a supplementary analysis, the US leniency is studied.
Zhou, Jun
core +1 more source
Collecting Evidence Through Access to Competition Authorities’ Files – Interplay or Potential Conflicts Between Private and Public Enforcement Proceedings? [PDF]
Information asymmetry between claimants seeking damages for competition law violations and the alleged infringing undertaking(s) is a key problem in the development of private antitrust enforcement because it often prevents successful actions for damages.
Anna Gulińska
doaj +1 more source
The leniency agreement: ananalysis of constitutional compatibility and legitimacy
The scope of this study is to analyze the institution of the Leniency Agreement, notably under the light of theAnticorruption Law provision (Law 12.846 of 2013)and theRegulatory Decree 8.420 of 2015.
Marlon roberth sales +1 more
doaj +1 more source
Organizational leniency: examining the consequences of ignoring performance problems in public organizations [PDF]
Organizational leniency, defined as management’s systematic failure to address performance problems (such as low productivity, poor quality of work, absenteeism, etc.), is often a reality in public organizations.
Gustavo M. Tavares +2 more
doaj +1 more source
Leniency – the Polish Programme and the ‘Semi-formal’ Harmonisation in the EU by the European Competition Network [PDF]
When studying the legal character of the Polish leniency programme, one cannot overlook its origin and the harmonisation process of such programmes in the EU.
Marcin Kulesza
doaj
THE MODEL OF CRIMINAL ACTIVITY AND EFFECTIVE CARTEL DETERRENCE
Cartels, or secret agreements between competitors, are universally recognized as the most harmful of all types of anticompetitive conduct. Facing the challenges associated with globalization of the market economy, competition authorities in all parts of ...
Danguolė Klimašauskienė
doaj +1 more source
Leniency Programs and Cartel Prosecution [PDF]
We study the enforcement of competition policy against collusion under Leniency Programs, which give reduced fines to firms revealing information to the Antitrust Authority. Such programs give firms an incentive to break collusion, but may also have a pro-collusive effect, since they decrease the expected cost of misbehaviour.
MOTTA M., POLO, MICHELE
openaire +6 more sources
The Impact of EU Law on a National Competition Authority’s Leniency Programme – the Case of Poland [PDF]
This paper is devoted to the impact of EU law on national leniency programmes, especially the Polish one. It analyses the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice in Pfleiderer, Donau Chemie and Schenker and identifies three specific areas of potential EU ...
Piotr Sitarek
doaj
Leniency policies and illegal transactions [PDF]
Forthcoming in the Journal of Public Economics. We study the consequences of leniency - reduced legal sanctions for wrongdoers who spontaneously self-report to law enforcers - on sequential, bilateral, illegal transactions, such as corruption, manager-auditor collusion, or drug deals.
Buccirossi, P, SPAGNOLO, GIANCARLO
openaire +5 more sources
The Effects of Leniency on Cartel Pricing [PDF]
AbstractWe analyze how leniency affects cartel pricing in an infinitely repeated oligopoly model where the fine rates are linked to illegal gains and detection probabilities depend on the degree of collusion. A novel aspect of this study is that we focus on the worst possible outcome. We investigate the maximal cartel price, the largest price for which
Harold Houba +2 more
openaire +6 more sources

