Results 1 to 10 of about 1,223 (219)
Limit Equilibrium Payoffs in Stochastic Games [PDF]
Mathematics of Operations Research, 2020 We study the limit of equilibrium payoffs, as the discount factor goes to one, in non-zero-sum stochastic games. We first show that the set of stationary equilibrium payoffs always converges. We then provide two-player examples in which the whole set of equilibrium payoffs diverges. The construction is robust to perturbations of the payoffs and to the
Jérôme Renault, Bruno Ziliotto
exaly +7 more sources
Hidden stochastic games and limit equilibrium payoffs
Games and Economic Behavior, 2020 We consider 2-player stochastic games with perfectly observed actions, and study the limit, as the discount factor goes to one, of the equilibrium payoffs set. In the usual setup where current states are observed by the players, we show that the set of stationary equilibrium payoffs always converges, and provide a simple example where the set of ...
Jérôme Renault, Bruno Ziliotto
exaly +6 more sources
Characterizing the limit set of perfect and public equilibrium payoffs with unequal discounting [PDF]
Theoretical Economics, 2015 zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.
Takuo Sugaya
exaly +6 more sources
On the Limit Equilibrium Payoff Set in Repeated and Stochastic Games [PDF]
SSRN Electronic Journal, 2012 This paper provides a dual characterization of the limit set of perfect public equilibrium payoffs in stochastic games (in particular, repeated games) as the discount factor tends to one. As a first corollary, the folk theorems of Fudenberg, Levine and Maskin (1994), Kandori and Matsushima (1998) and Horner, Sugaya, Takahashi and Vieille (2011) obtain.
Johannes Horner +2 more
openaire +5 more sources
Hidden Stochastic Games and Limit Equilibrium Payoffs
, 2017 We consider 2-player stochastic games with perfectly observed actions, and study the limit, as the discount factor goes to one, of the equilibrium payoffs set. In the usual setup where current states are observed by the players, we first show that the set of stationary equilibrium payoffs always converges.
Renault, Jérôme, Ziliotto, Bruno
openaire +2 more sources
Spoofing the Limit Order Book: A Strategic Agent-Based Analysis
Games, 2021 We present an agent-based model of manipulating prices in financial markets through spoofing: submitting spurious orders to mislead traders who learn from the order book. Our model captures a complex market environment for a single security, whose common
Xintong Wang +3 more
doaj +1 more source
Social learning in the ultimatum game. [PDF]
PLoS ONE, 2013 In the ultimatum game, two players divide a sum of money. The proposer suggests how to split and the responder can accept or reject. If the suggestion is rejected, both players get nothing.
Boyu Zhang
doaj +1 more source
Games, 2013 The finitely repeated Prisoners’ Dilemma is a good illustration of the discrepancy between the strategic behaviour suggested by a game-theoretic analysis and the behaviour often observed among human players, where cooperation is maintained ...
Kristian Lindgren, Vilhelm Verendel
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Agent-based modeling of quantum prisoner’s dilemma
APL QuantumWhat happens when an infinite number of players play a quantum game? In this paper, we will answer this question by looking at the emergence of cooperation, in the presence of noise, in a one-shot quantum prisoner’s dilemma (QuPD).
Colin Benjamin, Rajdeep Tah
doaj +1 more source
Evolution of noisy learning in games. [PDF]
Proc Natl Acad Sci U S ACouto MC, Santos FP, Hilbe C.
europepmc +1 more source