Results 51 to 60 of about 2,724 (151)

Faith and rational deference to authority

open access: yesPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research, Volume 108, Issue 3, Page 637-656, May 2024.
Abstract Many accounts of faith hold that faith is deference to an authority about what to believe or what to do. I show that this kind of faith fits into a more general account of faith, the risky‐commitment account. I further argue that it can be rational to defer to an authority even when the authority's pronouncement goes against one's own ...
Lara Buchak
wiley   +1 more source

Engendering moral post‐persons: A novel self‐help strategy [PDF]

open access: yes, 2020
Humans are morally deficient in a variety of ways. Some of these deficiencies threaten the continued existence of our species. For example, we appear to be incapable of responding to climate change in ways that are likely to prevent the consequent ...
Crutchfield, Parker
core  

The Pedagogy of “As If”

open access: yesEducational Theory, Volume 74, Issue 2, Page 145-164, April 2024.
Abstract In this paper Johan Dahlbeck sets out to propose a pedagogy of “as if,” seeking to address the educational paradox of how students can be influenced to approximate a life guided by reason without assuming that they are already sufficiently rational to adhere to dictates of practical reason.
Johan Dahlbeck
wiley   +1 more source

Educating for Intellectual Virtue: a critique from action guidance [PDF]

open access: yes, 2019
Virtue epistemology is among the dominant influences in mainstream epistemology today. An important commitment of one strand of virtue epistemology – responsibilist virtue epistemology (e.g., Montmarquet 1993; Zagzebski 1996; Battaly 2006; Baehr 2011 ...
Carter, J. Adam   +2 more
core   +2 more sources

The consequences of seeing imagination as a dual‐process virtue

open access: yesMetaphilosophy, Volume 55, Issue 2, Page 162-174, April 2024.
Abstract Michael T. Stuart (2021 and 2022) has proposed imagination as an intellectual dual‐process virtue, consisting of imagination1 (underwritten by cognitive Type 1 processing) and imagination2 (supported by Type 2 processing). This paper investigates the consequences of taking such an account seriously.
Ingrid Malm Lindberg
wiley   +1 more source

Can Epistemic Paternalistic Practice Make Us Better Epistemic Agents?

open access: yesEducational Theory, Volume 74, Issue 1, Page 108-122, February 2024.
Abstract Can epistemic paternalistic practices make us better epistemic agents? While a satisfying answer to this question will ultimately rest at least partly on empirical findings, considering the epistemological discussion on evidence, knowledge, and epistemic virtues can be insightful.
Giada Fratantonio
wiley   +1 more source

Epistemic Vice Rehabilitation: Saints and Sinners Zetetic Exemplarism

open access: yesEducational Theory, Volume 74, Issue 1, Page 123-140, February 2024.
Abstract This paper proposes a novel educational approach to epistemic vice rehabilitation. Its authors Gerry Dunne and Alkis Kotsonis note that, like Quassim Cassam, they remain optimistic about the possibility of improvement with regard to epistemic vice.
Gerry Dunne, Alkis Kotsonis
wiley   +1 more source

The Gettier Problem [PDF]

open access: yes, 2019
In this chapter, we will explore the luck at issue in Gettier-styled counterexamples and the subsequent problem it poses to any viable reductive analysis of knowledge.
Church, Ian M.
core   +1 more source

Two Varieties of Moral Exemplarism [PDF]

open access: yes, 2018
References to moral exemplars run deep into the history of philosophy, as we find them featured in rather disparate context and approaches which span from virtue ethics to moral perfectionism, from existentialism to moral particularism. In the varied and
Marchetti, Sarin
core  

An Epistemic Non-Consequentialism [PDF]

open access: yes, 2020
Despite the recent backlash against epistemic consequentialism, an explicit systematic alternative has yet to emerge. This paper articulates and defends a novel alternative, Epistemic Kantianism, which rests on a requirement of respect for the truth ...
Sylvan, Kurt L.
core   +1 more source

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