Results 191 to 200 of about 646 (230)

Managerial overconfidence and firm profitability

Asia-Pacific Journal of Accounting & Economics, 2019
This study examines how Chief Executive Officer (CEO) overconfidence affects profitability. Using United States data from 1992 to 2010, we find that firms with overconfident CEOs have a greater ret...
Hyun Ah Kim, Seung Uk Choi, Wooseok Choi
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Managerial overconfidence and corporate takeovers

International Journal of Managerial Finance, 2006
PurposeThe purpose of this paper is to model the announcement returns of merging firms based on managerial overconfidence about merger synergy.Design/methodology/approachThe paper applies continuous‐time real options techniques and game theoretic concepts.
Hongbo Pan, Xinping Xia, Minggui Yu
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Managerial Overconfidence and Accounting Conservatism

Journal of Accounting Research, 2012
ABSTRACTOverconfident managers overestimate future returns from their firms’ investments. Thus, we predict that overconfident managers will tend to delay loss recognition and generally use less conservative accounting. Furthermore, we test whether external monitoring helps to mitigate this effect.
Anwer S. Ahmed, Scott Duellman
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Managerial Overconfidence and Bank Bailouts

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 2020
Abstract Empirical evidence suggests that managerial overconfidence and government guarantees contribute substantially to excessive risk-taking in the banking industry. This paper incorporates managerial overconfidence and limited bank liability into a principal-agent model, where the bank manager unobservably chooses the level of risk.
Daniel Gietl, Bernhard Kassner
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Corporate Diversification and Managerial Overconfidence

SSRN Electronic Journal, 2011
This study investigates the role of managerial overconfidence in the context of corporate diversification decisions. First, we find that overconfident managers are more likely to manage diversified than focused firms. Second, we find that the diversification discount is concentrated exclusively in companies managed by overconfident managers.
Panayiotis C. Andreou, John A. Doukas, Christodoulos Louca   +2 more
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Managerial Overconfidence and Cost Stickiness

SSRN Electronic Journal, 2013
We propose managerial overconfidence as a behavioral explanation for SG&A cost stickiness. Building on the psychology literature, we predict that overconfident managers are more likely to overestimate future demand and therefore less likely to cut SG&A costs when sales decline.
Clara Xiaoling Chen, Timo Gores, Julia Nasev   +2 more
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Effects of managerial overconfidence on analyst recommendations

Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, 2018
This study investigates the relation between managerial overconfidence and analyst recommendations. The empirical finding shows that analysts are less likely to issue upgrade recommendations for firms managed by overconfident CEOs. Similarly, analysts spend a longer time to upgrade stocks associated with overconfident CEOs.
Mei-Chen Lin, Po-Hsin Ho, Hsiang-Lin Chih   +2 more
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Corporate Payout Policy and Managerial Overconfidence

SSRN Electronic Journal, 2012
We analyze the relation between managerial overconfidence and corporate payout policy. We predict that overconfident managers perceive their firm's equity to be undervalued and therefore prefer share repurchases over dividends when distributing cash to shareholders.
Valentin Burg, Tobias Scheinert, Daniel Streitz   +2 more
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Corporate Governance and Managerial Overconfidence

This chapter draws attention to the fact that corporate governance can help in moderating overconfidence, particularly in corporate strategic decisions. CEOs with overconfidence are more likely to engage in risky investment. Agency theory does endorse performance-related pay and independent directors.
Adil Cherkaoui, Youness Oudrhough
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Managerial Compensation Contracts and Overconfidence

2002
In this paper we analyze how overconfidence affects the principal-agent relationship when both the principal and the agent are assumed to be overconfident with respect to the quality of a common signal on the future state of nature. We study the impact of that psychological bias on both the compensation contract which the principal offers to the ...
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