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We set up a sequential merger game to study a firm's incentives to pass up on an opportunity to merge with another firm. We find that such incentives may exist when there are efficiency gains from a merger, firms are of different sizes, there is an antitrust authority present to approve mergers, and there is a sufficient alignment of interests between ...
Fumagalli, Eileen, Nilssen, Tore
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On “Merging” and the Fantasy of Merging
The Psychoanalytic Study of the Child, 1986(1986). On “Merging” and the Fantasy of Merging. The Psychoanalytic Study of the Child: Vol. 41, No. 1, pp. 155-170.
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On the Nature of Merge: External Merge, Internal Merge, and Parallel Merge
Linguistic Inquiry, 2005This article argues in favor of a new type of Merge, Parallel Merge, which combines the properties of External Merge and Internal Merge. Parallel Merge creates symmetric, multidominant structures, which become antisymmetric in the course of the derivation.The main empirical goal of the article is to revive a multidominance approach to across-the-board
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To Merge or Not to Merge: That Is the Question!
2016The transaction stage of the merger is described including the historical background regarding the University’s decision to merge. Deliberations regarding the strengths and limitations of merging the two departments are presented and analyzed. In these discussions, we highlight the politicking of organizational stakeholders who either supported or ...
Lisa A. Kihl +2 more
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Journal of Competition Law & Economics, 2023
Abstract We argue that mergers among market laggards (new entrants or innovation challengers) should be treated differently than those involving leaders (established players or first-mover innovators). We show that these mergers can be rivalry-enhancing, either by accelerating entry or promoting innovations, leading to lower quality ...
Padilla, Jorge +2 more
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Abstract We argue that mergers among market laggards (new entrants or innovation challengers) should be treated differently than those involving leaders (established players or first-mover innovators). We show that these mergers can be rivalry-enhancing, either by accelerating entry or promoting innovations, leading to lower quality ...
Padilla, Jorge +2 more
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