Results 41 to 50 of about 7,832 (189)

Norms and Significance in Ignorance. Reply to Duncan Pritchard

open access: yesPhilosophical Issues, Volume 35, Issue 1, Page 190-194, October 2025.
ABSTRACT This is a reply to Duncan Pritchard's response to my critique of his normative account of ignorance. Pritchard suggests that I take a Normative Condition on board in my own account of ignorance. Pritchard's suggestion has drastic revisionary and deflationary implications for how we use words like “ignorance” and “ignorant”.
Rik Peels
wiley   +1 more source

TESTING THE ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE SERVICE DEEPAI.ORG ON ITS ABILITY TO FOLLOW THE RULES OF FORMAL LOGIC

open access: yesОсвітній дискурс
Urgency of the research. The rapid progress of information technologies over the past few decades has significantly impacted many aspects of society. Special attention is drawn to the increasing use of artificial intelligence (AI).
Vasil Pihorovich, Andrii Samarskyi
doaj   +1 more source

Présentation de La Certitude de G. E. Moore

open access: yesPhilosophia Scientiæ, 2010
The first part of Certainty analyzes several assertions such as "I am standing up, I have clothes on, I have in my hand some sheets of paper", etc. Moore insists that, in spite of their contingent character, they may be known to be true with certainty ...
Bernard Drigout
doaj   +1 more source

Belief revision revised

open access: yesPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research, Volume 111, Issue 2, Page 696-727, September 2025.
Abstract I outline a novel counterexample to the principle of belief revision, Anticipation: if both learning e$e$ and learning not‐e$e$ would render belief in p$p$ unjustified, you cannot now be justified in believing p$p$. If I am right, not only is the leading theory of belief revision false, so are various recently proposed weakenings.
Joshua Edward Pearson
wiley   +1 more source

Recapture, Transparency, Negation and a Logic for the Catuṣkoṭi [PDF]

open access: yes, 2019
The recent literature on Nāgārjuna’s catuṣkoṭi centres around Jay Garfield’s (2009) and Graham Priest’s (2010) interpretation. It is an open discussion to what extent their interpretation is an adequate model of the logic for the catuskoti, and the Mūla-
KREUTZ, Adrian
core   +1 more source

Dialetheism and Modus Tollens

open access: yes, 2021
The Reasoner ; 15 ; 30 ...
Blumson, Ben Richard Kelsey   +1 more
openaire   +1 more source

P is not equal to NP by Modus Tollens

open access: yesCoRR, 2014
7 pages. Caution: this solution should not be reported to be correct while this caution stands. Actually, it is quite unlikely that this simple solution is correct. I am sharing this e-print to get comments on the probable mistake that I could not have found yet. If you have a conceptual grasp on Cooks Theory and some related glossaries then there will
openaire   +2 more sources

Our Statues of Wrongdoers

open access: yesJournal of Applied Philosophy, Volume 42, Issue 2, Page 564-580, May 2025.
ABSTRACT Many of those memorialized around us in statues are wrongdoers, and so we are often called to consider whether we should take down those statues. Some of those statutes are memorialized for reasons now taken to be wrong; others are memorialized not for but rather despite their wrongdoing. How should we consider those latter cases? One tempting
Craig K. Agule
wiley   +1 more source

Progressive Confirmation of Two Mental Systems

open access: yesProblemos
From current cognitive science, some theories propose that the human mind includes two systems: a system leading quick intuitions and a system ruling slow logical reasoning. Given that the systems are in the mind, one might think that their existence is
Miguel López Astorga
doaj   +3 more sources

A Meta-Logic of Inference Rules: Syntax [PDF]

open access: yes, 2014
This work was intended to be an attempt to introduce the meta-language for working with multiple-conclusion inference rules that admit asserted propositions along with the rejected propositions.
Citkin, Alex
core   +2 more sources

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