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European Journal of Analytic Philosophy, 2023 Recent contributions in moral philosophy have raised questions concerning the prevalent assumption that moral judgments are typologically discrete, and thereby distinct from ordinary and/or other types of judgments.
David Sackris, Rasmus Rosenberg Larsen
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Neural underpinnings of morality judgment and moral aesthetic judgment [PDF]
Scientific Reports, 2021 AbstractMorality judgment usually refers to the evaluation of moral behavior`s ability to affect others` interests and welfare, while moral aesthetic judgment often implies the appraisal of moral behavior's capability to provide aesthetic pleasure. Both are based on the behavioral understanding.
Qiuping Cheng +5 more
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Famine, Affluence, and Amorality
European Journal of Analytic Philosophy, 2021 I argue that the debate concerning the nature of first-person moral judgment, namely, whether such moral judgments are inherently motivating (internalism) or whether moral judgments can be made in the absence of motivation (externalism), may be founded ...
David Sackris
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How Large Is the Role of Emotion in Judgments of Moral Dilemmas? [PDF]
PLoS ONE, 2016 Moral dilemmas often pose dramatic and gut-wrenching emotional choices. It is now widely accepted that emotions are not simply experienced alongside people's judgments about moral dilemmas, but that our affective processes play a central role in ...
Zachary Horne, Derek Powell
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The Role of Emotions in Moral Judgment in Green’s View [PDF]
حکمت و فلسفه, 2021 Moral psychology for decades focused on reasoning, but recent evidence finds that emotions play a fundamental role in moral judgment. One of the models for explaining moral judgment is Greene’s Dual-process model of moral judgment.
Hossein Kharazmi
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Inability and Obligation in Moral Judgment. [PDF]
PLoS ONE, 2015 It is often thought that judgments about what we ought to do are limited by judgments about what we can do, or that "ought implies can." We conducted eight experiments to test the link between a range of moral requirements and abilities in ordinary moral
Wesley Buckwalter, John Turri
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Internalism and the frege: Geach problem [PDF]
Belgrade Philosophical Annual, 2019 According to the established understanding of the Frege-Geach problem, it is a challenge exclusively for metaethical expressivism. In this paper, I argue that it is much wider in scope: The problem applies generally to views according to which moral ...
Strandberg Caj
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Moral Foundations Theory Among Autistic and Neurotypical Children
Frontiers in Psychology, 2022 Morality can help guide behavior and facilitate relationships. Although moral judgments by autistic people are similar to neurotypical individuals, many researchers argue that subtle differences signify deficits in autistic individuals.
Erin Elizabeth Dempsey +10 more
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The boundary conditions of the liking bias in moral character judgments
Scientific Reports, 2022 Recent research has shown that moral character judgments are prone to the liking bias—well-liked people are seen as morally superior to disliked or neutral ones.
Konrad Bocian +4 more
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A reason-based explanation for moral dumbfounding [PDF]
Judgment and Decision Making, 2019 The moral dumbfounding phenomenon for harmless taboo violations is often cited as a critical piece of empirical evidence motivating anti-rationalist models of moral judgment and decision-making.
Matthew L. Stanley +2 more
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