Results 31 to 40 of about 4,823 (195)

Nash bargaining and risk aversion

open access: yesGames and Economic Behavior, 2016
zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.
Gordon C. Rausser, Leo K. Simon
openaire   +4 more sources

Nash Bargaining with Downward Rigid Wages [PDF]

open access: yes, 1997
We study the effect of downward wage rigidity in a dynamic model when wages are negotiated according to Nash bargaining. Downward rigidity causes a decrease in the worker’s expected utility.
Hopenhayn, Hugo   +3 more
core   +1 more source

The Nash bargaining solution is optimal [PDF]

open access: yesJournal of Economic Theory, 1986
The author studies the classical two-person bargaining game. The set F consists of all bargaining solutions that satisfy the following known axioms: Pareto optimality, scale invariance, symmetry and risk sensitivity. It is proved that for any bargaining game S the set \(\{\) f(S): \(f\in S\}\) is closed and connected. A meta bargaining game \(\Gamma\) (
openaire   +4 more sources

When Do Robots Go Green? Unveiling Mechanisms, Thresholds, and Spillovers of Industrial Robotics on Global Ecological Capacity

open access: yesBusiness Strategy and the Environment, EarlyView.
ABSTRACT This paper examines the relationship between industrial robotics adoption and ecological capacity, measured by biocapacity, using panel data from 50 countries over the period 2000–2024. We investigate the transmission mechanisms, non‐linearities, spatial spillovers, and heterogeneity characterizing this relationship.
Brahim Bergougui   +1 more
wiley   +1 more source

Nash bargaining in ordinal environments [PDF]

open access: yesReview of Economic Design, 2012
zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.
openaire   +5 more sources

Pharmaceutical Pricing and R&D as a Global Public Good

open access: yesHealth Economics, EarlyView.
ABSTRACT This paper examines the international variation in the prices of branded pharmaceuticals. We consider short‐run profits, or quasi‐rents, as representing each country's contribution toward the global public good of therapeutic information embodied in new pharmaceuticals.
H. E. Frech III   +3 more
wiley   +1 more source

Negotiating transfer pricing using the Nash bargaining solution

open access: yesInternational Journal of Applied Mathematics and Computer Science, 2017
This paper analyzes and proposes a solution to the transfer pricing problem from the point of view of the Nash bargaining game theory approach. We consider a firm consisting of several divisions with sequential transfers, in which central management ...
Clempner Julio B., Poznyak Alexander S.
doaj   +1 more source

Consensus‐Based Recommendations to Embrace Sustainable Luxury: A Delphi Study

open access: yesSustainable Development, EarlyView.
ABSTRACT Integrating sustainability into luxury practices presents unique challenges. Using a two‐phase Delphi method, this study develops consensus‐based recommendations for sustainable luxury. Findings identify key priorities including traceability, fair labour, circular design, and sustainable materials as essential for aligning luxury with ethical ...
Alexia Del Greco   +52 more
wiley   +1 more source

Nash Bargaining Game Enhanced Global Malmquist Productivity Index for Cross-Productivity Index

open access: yesGames
The Global Malmquist Productivity Index (GMPI) stands as an evolution of the Malmquist Productivity Index (MPI), emphasizing global technology to incorporate all-time versions of Decision-Making Units (DMUs).
Reza Fallahnejad   +3 more
doaj   +1 more source

Competitive diplomacy in bargaining and war

open access: yesAmerican Journal of Political Science, EarlyView.
Abstract War is often viewed as a bargaining problem. However, prior to bargaining, countries can vie for leverage by expending effort on diplomacy. This article presents a dynamic model of conflict where agenda‐setting power is endogenous to pre‐bargaining diplomatic competition.
Joseph J. Ruggiero
wiley   +1 more source

Home - About - Disclaimer - Privacy