Results 51 to 60 of about 235,291 (244)

Seeing like a citizen: Experimental evidence on how empowerment affects engagement with the state

open access: yesAmerican Journal of Political Science, EarlyView.
Abstract Building a strong and effective state requires revenue. Yet, in many low‐income countries, citizens do not make formal payments to the state or forego engaging with the state altogether due to vulnerability to opportunistic demands by state agents. We study two randomized interventions in Kinshasa, Democratic Republic of the Congo, designed to
Soeren J. Henn   +4 more
wiley   +1 more source

Optimization of operation and dispatching of integrated energy system based on Nash bargaining model

open access: yesEAI Endorsed Transactions on Energy Web
  INTRODUCTION: With the growing energy demand, the Integrated Energy System (IES) has attracted wide attention for its high efficiency, economy, and environmental friendliness.
Yuwei Wang   +4 more
doaj   +1 more source

Raiffa-Kalai-Smorodinsky Bargaining Solution for Bilateral Contracts in Electricity Markets

open access: yesEnergies, 2020
In electricity markets, bilateral contracts (BC) are used to hedge against price volatility in the spot market. Pricing these contracts requires scheduling from either the buyer or the seller aiming to achieve the highest profit possible.
Reinaldo Crispiniano Garcia   +4 more
doaj   +1 more source

Yardstick competition under fiscal and administrative asymmetries: Rent‐seeking and local cooperation

open access: yesAnnals of Public and Cooperative Economics, EarlyView.
Abstract This paper develops a two‐period model to investigate how fiscal and bureaucratic asymmetries shape yardstick competition (YC), inter‐municipal cooperation (IMC), and rent‐seeking in local public service provision. Unlike previous approaches, we allow incumbents to invest in bureaucratic efficiency, influencing both service quality and ...
Antonio Cortese   +2 more
wiley   +1 more source

Ecology-economic system of bioresource' exploitation with vector payoffs

open access: yesTransactions of the Karelian Research Centre of the Russian Academy of Sciences, 2018
Discrete time game-theoretic model of ecology-economic system is considered. Agents (firms or fishermen's artels) which exploit the fish stock on a finite planning horizon are the participants of the game.
Anna Nickolaevna Rettieva
doaj   +1 more source

Green Investment Decisions and Coordination in a Green Agri-Product Supply Chain considering Risk Aversion and Bargaining Power under Different Channel Power Structures

open access: yesComplexity, 2023
With eco-friendly green agriculture becoming the development trend of modern agriculture, how to make green investments and how to coordinate the supply chain become the key issues of agricultural green development.
Shizhen Bai   +3 more
doaj   +1 more source

Nash-Bargaining Fairness Concerns under Push and Pull Supply Chains

open access: yesMathematics, 2023
Unbalanced power structures can lead to an inequitable distribution of the supply chain’s profits, creating unstable supply chain relationships and serious social problems. This paper builds a two-tier newsvendor model composed of a single supplier and a
Shuchen Ni, Chun Feng, Handan Gou
doaj   +1 more source

Core-equivalence for the Nash bargaining solution [PDF]

open access: yesEconomic Theory, 2005
zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.
openaire   +4 more sources

Collusion through debt and managers

open access: yesCanadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique, EarlyView.
Abstract We investigate the anticompetitive effects of debt financing and managerial incentives in the presence of managers incurring personal bankruptcy costs. We characterize the strategic value for firms' shareholders of resorting to debt and managerial incentives as complementary devices to sustain collusion among firms, when managerial bankruptcy ...
Raffaele Fiocco   +2 more
wiley   +1 more source

Spite in litigation

open access: yesCanadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique, EarlyView.
Abstract This paper studies how litigation and settlement behaviour is affected by agents motivated by spiteful preferences under the American fee‐shifting rule compared to the English one. We conduct an experiment and find that litigation expenditures are overall higher under the English rule compared to the American rule—even for low‐merit cases ...
Wladislaw Mill, Jonathan Stäbler
wiley   +1 more source

Home - About - Disclaimer - Privacy