Results 51 to 60 of about 955 (196)

Nash-Bargaining Fairness Concerns under Push and Pull Supply Chains

open access: yesMathematics, 2023
Unbalanced power structures can lead to an inequitable distribution of the supply chain’s profits, creating unstable supply chain relationships and serious social problems. This paper builds a two-tier newsvendor model composed of a single supplier and a
Shuchen Ni, Chun Feng, Handan Gou
doaj   +1 more source

Yardstick competition under fiscal and administrative asymmetries: Rent‐seeking and local cooperation

open access: yesAnnals of Public and Cooperative Economics, EarlyView.
Abstract This paper develops a two‐period model to investigate how fiscal and bureaucratic asymmetries shape yardstick competition (YC), inter‐municipal cooperation (IMC), and rent‐seeking in local public service provision. Unlike previous approaches, we allow incumbents to invest in bureaucratic efficiency, influencing both service quality and ...
Antonio Cortese   +2 more
wiley   +1 more source

Ecology-economic system of bioresource' exploitation with vector payoffs

open access: yesTransactions of the Karelian Research Centre of the Russian Academy of Sciences, 2018
Discrete time game-theoretic model of ecology-economic system is considered. Agents (firms or fishermen's artels) which exploit the fish stock on a finite planning horizon are the participants of the game.
Anna Nickolaevna Rettieva
doaj   +1 more source

Extreme weather and economic crisis in the 1430s in England, and the implications for tenurial change

open access: yesThe Economic History Review, EarlyView.
Abstract The 1430s were characterized by extreme weather conditions, food and fodder shortages, and high mortalities among animals and humans, although the severity of events and their consequences in England have received limited attention. The economic downturn and the depressed customary land market in this decade marked the beginning of the Great ...
Mark Bailey
wiley   +1 more source

Core-equivalence for the Nash bargaining solution [PDF]

open access: yesEconomic Theory, 2005
zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.
openaire   +4 more sources

The Interaction Between Credit and Labor Market Frictions

open access: yesInternational Economic Review, EarlyView.
ABSTRACT I study a novel two‐way feedback between credit and labor market frictions. Running from credit to labor markets, amplitude in capital demand caused by collateral constraints spills over onto labor demand due to the complementarity of capital and labor; and, furthermore, credit frictions raise effective financial hiring costs, prompting firms ...
Yulia Moiseeva
wiley   +1 more source

Bertrand Game with Nash Bargaining Fairness Concern

open access: yesComplexity, 2019
The classical Bertrand game is assumed that players are perfectly rational. However, many empirical researches indicate that people have bounded rational behavior with fairness concern, which is important in the two-person game and has attracted much ...
Wentao Yi, Chunqiao Tan
doaj   +1 more source

From Bargaining Solutions to Claims Rules: A Proportional Approach

open access: yesGames, 2015
Agents involved in a conflicting claims problem may be concerned with the proportion of their claims that is satisfied, or with the total amount they get.
José-Manuel Giménez-Gómez   +2 more
doaj   +1 more source

The Decentralization of Liquor Policies in Texas During the Post‐Prohibition Era

open access: yesInternational Economic Review, EarlyView.
ABSTRACT We examine the decentralization of liquor policies in Texas during the Post‐Prohibition era using newly collected historical legislative roll call data. By combining these data with local referendum vote shares, we analyze both legislators' and constituents' preferences on liquor policy.
Andrew Arnold, Holger Sieg
wiley   +1 more source

Bargaining Power Choices with Moral Hazard in a Supply Chain

open access: yesDiscrete Dynamics in Nature and Society, 2018
A supply chain contract is established using a dynamic, Nash bargaining game which determines the optimal bargaining power allocation for the manufacturer, retailer, and society in an environment affected by moral hazard and irreversible investment.
Hongmei Guo, Shuiliang Gu, Yingsheng Su
doaj   +1 more source

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