Results 51 to 60 of about 955 (196)
Nash-Bargaining Fairness Concerns under Push and Pull Supply Chains
Unbalanced power structures can lead to an inequitable distribution of the supply chain’s profits, creating unstable supply chain relationships and serious social problems. This paper builds a two-tier newsvendor model composed of a single supplier and a
Shuchen Ni, Chun Feng, Handan Gou
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Abstract This paper develops a two‐period model to investigate how fiscal and bureaucratic asymmetries shape yardstick competition (YC), inter‐municipal cooperation (IMC), and rent‐seeking in local public service provision. Unlike previous approaches, we allow incumbents to invest in bureaucratic efficiency, influencing both service quality and ...
Antonio Cortese +2 more
wiley +1 more source
Ecology-economic system of bioresource' exploitation with vector payoffs
Discrete time game-theoretic model of ecology-economic system is considered. Agents (firms or fishermen's artels) which exploit the fish stock on a finite planning horizon are the participants of the game.
Anna Nickolaevna Rettieva
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Abstract The 1430s were characterized by extreme weather conditions, food and fodder shortages, and high mortalities among animals and humans, although the severity of events and their consequences in England have received limited attention. The economic downturn and the depressed customary land market in this decade marked the beginning of the Great ...
Mark Bailey
wiley +1 more source
Core-equivalence for the Nash bargaining solution [PDF]
zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.
openaire +4 more sources
The Interaction Between Credit and Labor Market Frictions
ABSTRACT I study a novel two‐way feedback between credit and labor market frictions. Running from credit to labor markets, amplitude in capital demand caused by collateral constraints spills over onto labor demand due to the complementarity of capital and labor; and, furthermore, credit frictions raise effective financial hiring costs, prompting firms ...
Yulia Moiseeva
wiley +1 more source
Bertrand Game with Nash Bargaining Fairness Concern
The classical Bertrand game is assumed that players are perfectly rational. However, many empirical researches indicate that people have bounded rational behavior with fairness concern, which is important in the two-person game and has attracted much ...
Wentao Yi, Chunqiao Tan
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From Bargaining Solutions to Claims Rules: A Proportional Approach
Agents involved in a conflicting claims problem may be concerned with the proportion of their claims that is satisfied, or with the total amount they get.
José-Manuel Giménez-Gómez +2 more
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The Decentralization of Liquor Policies in Texas During the Post‐Prohibition Era
ABSTRACT We examine the decentralization of liquor policies in Texas during the Post‐Prohibition era using newly collected historical legislative roll call data. By combining these data with local referendum vote shares, we analyze both legislators' and constituents' preferences on liquor policy.
Andrew Arnold, Holger Sieg
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Bargaining Power Choices with Moral Hazard in a Supply Chain
A supply chain contract is established using a dynamic, Nash bargaining game which determines the optimal bargaining power allocation for the manufacturer, retailer, and society in an environment affected by moral hazard and irreversible investment.
Hongmei Guo, Shuiliang Gu, Yingsheng Su
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