Results 71 to 80 of about 1,733 (241)
The “Zhang Xuefeng Effect”: Information Intervention and the College Admission Problem in China
ABSTRACT Information regarding the quality of colleges and labor‐market prospects of majors plays an important role in parents' and students' school‐choice decisions, particularly when these decisions are crucially relevant to the students' long‐run career choices and life earnings.
Yutong Huo, Yun Wang
wiley +1 more source
zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.
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Impact of Geography on Institutions in Agricultural and Nomadic Societies
ABSTRACT How geography affects the choice of institutions is studied in a theoretical model. In this model, nations are located around a circle. Rulers compete through choosing tax rates, the level of military spending, and the degree of formality of institutions. Geographic condition is captured by population density.
Haiwen Zhou
wiley +1 more source
Evolutionary Network Games: Equilibria from Imitation and Best Response Dynamics
We consider games of strategic substitutes and complements on networks and introduce two evolutionary dynamics in order to refine their multiplicity of equilibria.
Giulio Cimini
doaj +1 more source
ABSTRACT The relationship between team composition and organizational outcomes is a critical topic in many managerial and business contexts. In this study, we utilize an experimental research method to examine the impact of cognitive diversity on team dynamics.
Jantunen Ari +5 more
wiley +1 more source
Nash equilibria in quantum games [PDF]
For any two-by-two gameG\mathbf {G}, we define a new two-player gameGQ\mathbf {G}^Q. The definition is motivated by a vision of players in gameG\mathbf {G}communicating via quantum technology according to the protocol introduced by J. Eisert and M.
openaire +4 more sources
The Optimal Strategy in the Minimum Effort Game
A simple expression is derived for the optimal strategy in the minimum effort game. This maps from player beliefs to an optimal effort level. From this expression the set of Nash equilibria in the game is fully characterized.
Edward Cartwright
doaj +1 more source
Tactical and Strategic Risks From Supply Disruptions in Competing Supply Chains
ABSTRACT Supply chain disruptions can lead to both tactical (i.e., loss of short‐term sales during a disruption) and strategic (i.e., loss of long‐term market share) consequences. We model the impact of a supply disruption on competing supply chains in which two firms compete for a limited backup supply.
Akhil Singla +3 more
wiley +1 more source
This paper generalises the Hawk-Dove evolutionary game by introducing cost sharing ratios for both players, and applies the generalised Hawk-Dove model to conflict management in projects through investigating the stability of Nash equilibria.
Sheryl Le Chang, Mikhail Prokopenko
doaj +1 more source
Pure Nash Equilibria: Hard and Easy Games
We investigate complexity issues related to pure Nash equilibria of strategic games. We show that, even in very restrictive settings, determining whether a game has a pure Nash Equilibrium is NP-hard, while deciding whether a game has a strong Nash equilibrium is SigmaP2-complete.
Gottlob G +2 more
openaire +8 more sources

