Results 111 to 120 of about 1,067,568 (299)
A formula for Nash equilibria in monotone singleton congestion games [PDF]
This paper provides a simple formula describing all Nash equilibria in symmetric monotone singleton congestion games. Our approach also yields a new and short proof establishing the existence of a Nash equilibrium in this kind of congestion games without
Hatem SMAOUI, CEMOI +2 more
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Network Structure and the Efficiency Gains from Mergers: Evidence from U.S. Freight Railroads
The RAND Journal of Economics, EarlyView.ABSTRACT The trade‐off between market power and efficiency gains is central to antitrust analyses of mergers, but empirical evidence quantifying efficiencies remains limited. Using transaction‐level data from U.S. freight railroads (1985–2005), this article quantifies merger‐induced cost efficiencies, driven mainly by eliminating inter‐railroad ...
Yanyou Chen
wiley +1 more source
An improved predator-prey particle swarm optimization algorithm for Nash equilibrium solution. [PDF]
PLoS One, 2021 Meng Y, He J, Luo S, Tao S, Xu J.
europepmc +1 more source
Pure self-confirming equilibrium [PDF]
In a Self-Confirming Equilibrium (Fudenberg and Levine, 1993A) every player obtains partial information about other players' strategies and plays a best response to some conjecture which is consistent with his information.
Azrieli, Yaron
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Contemporary Accounting Research, EarlyView.ABSTRACT This paper studies how the accuracy of a short‐term performance measure affects its value when a principal decides whether to retain or fire an agent, who can manipulate that measure. Compared with ignoring performance and never firing the agent, the performance measure is valuable when the savings in the expected cost of the retention error ...
Naomi Rothenberg
wiley +1 more source
Nash Equilibrium as an Expression of Self-Referential Reasoning [PDF]
Within a formal epistemic model for simultaneous-move games, we present the following conditions: (1) belief in the opponents'' rationality (BOR), stating that a player should believe that every opponent chooses an optimal strategy, (2) self-referential ...
Perea, Andrés
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Intertemporal Dynamics of Cost Asymmetry Dynamique intertemporelle d'asymétrie des coûts
Contemporary Accounting Research, EarlyView.ABSTRACT We study the intertemporal dynamics of asymmetric cost behavior in a competitive setting. Our analysis delves into the primitives of cost asymmetry and explores its dynamic evolution over time. The analysis yields the result that cost behavior is asymmetric by default and path‐dependent, transpiring as cost stickiness following prior resource ...
Eti Einhorn, Efrat Shust
wiley +1 more source
The Geometry of Nash Equilibria and Correlated Equilibria and a Generalization of Zero-Sum Games [PDF]
A pure strategy is coherent if it is played with positive probability in at least one correlated equilibrium. A game is pre-tight if in every correlated equilibrium, all incentives constraints for non deviating to a coherent strategy are tight.
Viossat, Yannick
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Seeing like a citizen: Experimental evidence on how empowerment affects engagement with the state
American Journal of Political Science, EarlyView.Abstract Building a strong and effective state requires revenue. Yet, in many low‐income countries, citizens do not make formal payments to the state or forego engaging with the state altogether due to vulnerability to opportunistic demands by state agents. We study two randomized interventions in Kinshasa, Democratic Republic of the Congo, designed to
Soeren J. Henn +4 more
wiley +1 more source
Observable implications of Nash and subgame-perfect behavior in extensive games [PDF]
We provide necessary and sufficient conditions for observed outcomes in extensive game forms, in which preferences are unobserved, to be rationalized first, partially, as a Nash equilibrium and then, fully, as the unique subgame-perfect equilibrium. Thus,
Indrajit Ray, Susan Snyder
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