From rationality to cooperativeness: The totally mixed Nash equilibrium in Markov strategies in the iterated Prisoner's Dilemma. [PDF]
Menshikov IS +3 more
europepmc +1 more source
RPM and Vertical Integration With Upstream Competition and Noncontractible Efforts
ABSTRACT We study RPM and vertical integration in a common agency setting with two differentiated manufacturers and one retailer, where consumer demand depends on both the manufacturers' and retailer's noncontractible efforts. Under vertical separation, the adoption of maximum RPM by both manufacturers is an equilibrium and intensifies competition ...
Michele Bisceglia +3 more
wiley +1 more source
Local Nash equilibrium in social networks. [PDF]
Zhang Y +3 more
europepmc +1 more source
Bad NGOs? Competition in the Market for Donations and Workers' Misconduct
ABSTRACT In this paper, we investigate how competition among NGOs to attract donations shapes the incentives that NGOs provide to their employees. NGOs hire workers to undertake development projects, which are horizontally and vertically differentiated.
Nadia Burani, Ester Manna
wiley +1 more source
Nash Equilibrium of Social-Learning Agents in a Restless Multiarmed Bandit Game. [PDF]
Nakayama K, Hisakado M, Mori S.
europepmc +1 more source
Make or Buy Decisions and Data Sharing
ABSTRACT Firms can share data to discover potential synergies between their data sets and algorithms, eventually leading to more efficient mergers and acquisitions (M&A) decisions. However, data sharing also modifies the competitive balance when firms do not merge, and a company may be reluctant to share data with potential rivals.
Antoine Dubus, Patrick Legros
wiley +1 more source
From Nash Equilibrium to Social Optimum and Back: A Mean Field Perspective. [PDF]
Carmona R +3 more
europepmc +1 more source
Recency, consistent learning, and Nash equilibrium. [PDF]
Fudenberg D, Levine DK.
europepmc +1 more source
Lurking Patent Claims and Strategic Royalty Contracts
ABSTRACT This paper analyzes optimal licensing contracts when a licensee faces the risk of future infringement claims by unknown patent holders. In a setting where a noncompeting licensor contracts with a monopolistic manufacturer, fixed‐fee licensing is optimal absent such claims.
Jay Pil Choi
wiley +1 more source
Correction: Nash equilibrium of attack and defense behaviors between predators and prey. [PDF]
PLOS Computational Biology Staff.
europepmc +1 more source

