Results 131 to 140 of about 1,067,568 (299)
Evolutionary stability and Nash equilibrium in finite populations, with an application to price competition [PDF]
Schaffer (1988) proposed a concept of evolutionary stability for finite-population models that has interesting implications in economic models of evolutionary learning, since it is related to perfectly competitive equilibrium.
Ana B. Ania
core
The effects of minimum wage regulation in inter‐regional oligopoly competition
Abstract We examine how minimum wage regulation affects firm profit when labor‐market power interacts with product‐market competition. A binding wage floor reduces the regulated firm's marginal labor cost, inducing it to expand production. This expansion can induce rivals to contract production when relevant strategic variables are strategic ...
Noriaki Matsushima +2 more
wiley +1 more source
Imitation and the emergence of Nash equilibrium play in games with many players [PDF]
We model a learning dynamic in which players imitate and innovate. Of interest is to question whether Nash equilibrium play emerges, and if so, the role that imitation plays in this emergence.
Cartwright, Edward
core
Abstract I argue that economists' distinction between ‘pure’ and ‘applied’ economic theory is often based on papers' stylistic markers rather than their methodology or scope. I illustrate this point with a model of price competition for boundedly rational consumers, due to Piccione and Spiegler. I first present its original, ‘pure style’ version.
Ran Spiegler
wiley +1 more source
THE ROBUSTNESS OF EQUILIBRIUM ANALYSIS: THE CASE OF UNDOMINATED NASH EQUILIBRIUM [PDF]
I consider a strategic game form with a finite set of payoff states and employ undominated Nash equilibrium (UNE) as a solution concept under complete information. I propose notions of the proximity of information according to which the continuity of UNE
Takashi Kunimoto
core
Abstract A laboratory experiment finds that teams acting as a decision‐making unit through communication behave more efficiently than individuals. Decision‐making units vote on formal and informal sanctions in a repeated public goods dilemma. When a formal scheme is selected, teams vote for deterrent sanction rates more frequently than individuals ...
Kenju Kamei, Katy Tabero
wiley +1 more source
Fall back equilibrium is a refinement of the Nash equilibrium concept. In the underly- ing thought experiment each player faces the possibility that, after all players decided on their action, his chosen action turns out to be blocked.
Borm, P.E.M. +2 more
core
The Dynamics of Gender Norms and Fertility Decline
ABSTRACT This paper models fertility as the outcome of gender‐biased technological progress interacting with endogenous social norms governing childcare. When rising female wages outpace norm adjustment, the inherited norm makes reallocating childcare toward fathers costly, so mothers bear a disproportionate burden and the shadow price of children ...
Xican Xi, Anson Zhou
wiley +1 more source
Modeling of Collusion Behavior in the Electrical Market Based on Deep Deterministic Policy Gradient
The evolution of the electricity market has brought the issues of market equilibrium and collusion to the forefront of attention. This paper introduces the Deep Deterministic Policy Gradient (DDPG) algorithm on the IEEE three-bus electrical market model.
Yifeng Liu +5 more
doaj +1 more source
An outcome in a noncooperative game is said to be self-enforcing, or a strategic equilibrium, if, whenever it is recommended to the players, no player has an incentive to deviate from it.This paper gives an overview of the concepts that have been ...
Damme, E.E.C. van
core

