Results 131 to 140 of about 32,632 (304)
Inter‐disciplinary perspectives on sustainability in machinery manufacturing
International Journal of Management Reviews, EarlyView.Abstract Perspectives on economic, social and environmental sustainability in machinery manufacturing are changing. These are predominantly driven by increased consumer, firm and public knowledge on the importance of sustainability and the role that machinery manufacturers can play to achieve sustainability outcomes.
Oluwaseun E. Olabode +5 more
wiley +1 more source
Nash Equilibrium as an Expression of Self-Referential Reasoning
Within a formal epistemic model for simultaneous-move games, we present the following conditions: (1) belief in the opponents'' rationality (BOR), stating that a player should believe that every opponent chooses an optimal strategy, (2) self-referential ...
Perea, Andrés
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The Geometry of Nash Equilibria and Correlated Equilibria and a Generalization of Zero-Sum Games [PDF]
A pure strategy is coherent if it is played with positive probability in at least one correlated equilibrium. A game is pre-tight if in every correlated equilibrium, all incentives constraints for non deviating to a coherent strategy are tight.
Viossat, Yannick
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Assessing second‐price auctions for parcel exchanges in last‐mile logistics
International Transactions in Operational Research, EarlyView.Abstract The rapid growth of e‐commerce has led to multiple carriers operating in the same regions, creating opportunities for collaboration. However, logistics companies typically operate independently, leading to inefficiencies. Horizontal cooperation, where carriers share resources and infrastructure, can improve efficiency and reduce costs.
Christian Truden, Margaretha Gansterer
wiley +1 more source
Evolutionary stability and Nash equilibrium in finite populations, with an application to price competition [PDF]
Schaffer (1988) proposed a concept of evolutionary stability for finite-population models that has interesting implications in economic models of evolutionary learning, since it is related to perfectly competitive equilibrium.
Ana B. Ania
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Product Positioning and Incentives to Innovate
Journal of Economics &Management Strategy, EarlyView.ABSTRACT This paper shows that product positioning affects the incentives to invest in process innovation. The result is found using a model of price competition with three firms under horizontal product differentiation—and then extended to a more general Bertrand triopoly.
Emanuele Bacchiega, Paolo G. Garella
wiley +1 more source
We Value Your Privacy: Behavior‐Based Pricing Under Endogenous Privacy
Journal of Economics &Management Strategy, EarlyView.ABSTRACT We study a duopoly model of behavior‐based pricing in which consumers can either disclose or hide their data. We contrast two data policies. Under an open data policy, disclosed data is shared with all firms. In the unique equilibrium, all consumers disclose, and firms price discriminate, leading to welfare losses from inefficient poaching ...
Friederike Heiny +2 more
wiley +1 more source
Nash-Type Equilibria Theorems and Competitive Nash-Type Equilibrium Theorems
, 2011 [[abstract]]In this paper, we consider two types of equilibrium problems. We study the constrained Nash-type equilibrium problems with multivalued payoff functions.
Lin, Lai-Jiu; Shih Feng, Cheng
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Incentive and Signaling Effects of Bonus Payments: An Experiment in a Company
Journal of Economics &Management Strategy, EarlyView.ABSTRACT Economists and management scholars have argued that the scope of incentives to increase cooperation in organizations is limited as their use may signal the prevalence of free‐riding among employees. This paper tests this hypothesis with an artefactual field experiment that assigns managers and employees from a large company to stylized roles ...
Marvin Deversi, Lisa Spantig
wiley +1 more source
How to use Rosen's normalised equilibrium to enforce a socially desirable Pareto efficient solution [PDF]
We consider a situation, in which a regulator believes that constraining a complex good created jointly by competitive agents, is socially desirable. Individual levels of outputs that generate the constrained amount of the externality can be computed as ...
Jacek B. Krawczyk, Mabel Tidball
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