Results 141 to 150 of about 32,632 (304)

Evidence Gathering Under Competitive and Noncompetitive Rewards

Journal of Economics &Management Strategy, EarlyView.
ABSTRACT Reward schemes may affect not only agents' effort but also their incentives to gather information in order to reduce the riskiness of the productive activity. In a laboratory experiment using a novel task, we find that the relationship between incentives and evidence gathering depends critically on the availability of information about peers ...
Philip Brookins, Jennifer Brown, Dmitry Ryvkin   +2 more
wiley   +1 more source

Teaching Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibrium to Undergraduates [PDF]

The authors present a simple and effective method for improving student comprehension of mixed strategies. After reviewing available texts, and with some trial and error, we feel that this method eases the teaching of the information and increases the ...
Kenneth Garrett, Evan Moore
core  

Optimal Healthcare Contracts: Theory and Empirical Evidence

Journal of Economics &Management Strategy, EarlyView.
ABSTRACT In this paper, we investigate the contracts offered by a large healthcare purchaser to health service providers. Contracts are based on the DRG principle that all hospitalizations in a diagnosis group are reimbursed at the same rate. This principle is relaxed in practice, as in several cases, the amount reimbursed within each DRG exhibits ...
Paolo Berta, Gianni De Fraja, Stefano Verzillo   +2 more
wiley   +1 more source

Decentralization of the core through Nash equilibrium [PDF]

We show that in large finite economies, core allocations can be approximately decentralized as Nash (rather than Walras) equilibrium. We argue that this excrcise is an essential complement to asymptotic core equivalence results, because it implies that ...
KOUTSOUGERAS, Leonidas, ZIROS, Nicholas
core  

Tariffs and Foreign Direct Investment in a Dynamic North–South Model

Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, EarlyView.
Abstract This paper examines how import tariffs by a developed country (the North) and a developing country (the South) affect innovation and foreign direct investment (FDI) using a quality ladder model. We show that a Northern import tariff raises the relative wage of Northern labor, but impedes innovation and FDI. This may worsen Northern welfare. By
TATSURO IWAISAKO, HITOSHI TANAKA
wiley   +1 more source

More strategies, more Nash equilibria [PDF]

This short paper isolates a non-trivial class of games for which there exists a monotone relation between the size of pure strategy spaces and the number of pure Nash equilibria (Theorem).
Sophie Bade, Guillaume Haeringer, Ludovic Renou   +2 more
core  

Liquidity Crises and the Market‐Maker of Last Resort

Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, EarlyView.
Abstract We study market illiquidity in an economy subject to nonfundamental shocks. Asset trading occurs via decentralized bargaining. The model has multiple rational expectations equilibria; we associate certain Pareto‐inferior equilibria with liquidity crises.
CHARLES M. KAHN, DAVID MARSHALL, ROBERT L. MCDONALD   +2 more
wiley   +1 more source

Policy Biases in a Model with Labor‐Market Frictions

Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, EarlyView.
Abstract We develop a model with labor‐market matching frictions that is subject to a range of shocks, including shocks to matching efficiency and bargaining power, and use the model to examine how monetary policy should respond to such shocks. We show that optimal monetary policy responds effectively to these shocks, producing economic outcomes that ...
RICHARD DENNIS, TATIANA KIRSANOVA
wiley   +1 more source

Observable implications of Nash and subgame-perfect behavior in extensive games [PDF]

We provide necessary and sufficient conditions for observed outcomes in extensive game forms, in which preferences are unobserved, to be rationalized first, partially, as a Nash equilibrium and then, fully, as the unique subgame-perfect equilibrium. Thus,
Indrajit Ray, Susan Snyder
core  

RPM and Vertical Integration With Upstream Competition and Noncontractible Efforts

The Journal of Industrial Economics, EarlyView.
ABSTRACT We study RPM and vertical integration in a common agency setting with two differentiated manufacturers and one retailer, where consumer demand depends on both the manufacturers' and retailer's noncontractible efforts. Under vertical separation, the adoption of maximum RPM by both manufacturers is an equilibrium and intensifies competition ...
Michele Bisceglia, Mark Israel, Salvatore Piccolo, Paolo Ramezzana   +3 more
wiley   +1 more source