Results 151 to 160 of about 890,283 (214)
Evidence Gathering Under Competitive and Noncompetitive Rewards
Journal of Economics &Management Strategy, EarlyView.ABSTRACT Reward schemes may affect not only agents' effort but also their incentives to gather information in order to reduce the riskiness of the productive activity. In a laboratory experiment using a novel task, we find that the relationship between incentives and evidence gathering depends critically on the availability of information about peers ...
Philip Brookins +2 more
wiley +1 more source
Network Topology and Equilibrium Existence in Weighted Network Congestion Games [PDF]
Every finite noncooperative game can be presented as a weighted network congestion game, and also as a network congestion game with player-specific costs.
Igal Milchtaich
core
Optimal Healthcare Contracts: Theory and Empirical Evidence
Journal of Economics &Management Strategy, EarlyView.ABSTRACT In this paper, we investigate the contracts offered by a large healthcare purchaser to health service providers. Contracts are based on the DRG principle that all hospitalizations in a diagnosis group are reimbursed at the same rate. This principle is relaxed in practice, as in several cases, the amount reimbursed within each DRG exhibits ...
Paolo Berta +2 more
wiley +1 more source
Nash Equilibrium Strategies in Discrete-Time Finite-Horizon Dynamic Games with Risk-and Effort-Averse Players [PDF]
The objective of this paper is to re-examine the risk-and effort attitude in the context of strategic dynamic interactions stated as a discrete-time finite-horizon Nash game.
Dan Protopopescu
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Policy Biases in a Model with Labor‐Market Frictions
Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, EarlyView.Abstract We develop a model with labor‐market matching frictions that is subject to a range of shocks, including shocks to matching efficiency and bargaining power, and use the model to examine how monetary policy should respond to such shocks. We show that optimal monetary policy responds effectively to these shocks, producing economic outcomes that ...
RICHARD DENNIS, TATIANA KIRSANOVA
wiley +1 more source
Make or Buy Decisions and Data Sharing
The Journal of Industrial Economics, EarlyView.ABSTRACT Firms can share data to discover potential synergies between their data sets and algorithms, eventually leading to more efficient mergers and acquisitions (M&A) decisions. However, data sharing also modifies the competitive balance when firms do not merge, and a company may be reluctant to share data with potential rivals.
Antoine Dubus, Patrick Legros
wiley +1 more source
Feedback Nash Equilibria for Linear Quadratic Descriptor Differential Games [PDF]
In this note we consider the non-cooperative linear feedback Nash quadratic differential game with an infinite planning horizon for descriptor systems of index one. The performance function is assumed to be indefinite.
Salmah, Y., Engwerda, J.C.
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Lurking Patent Claims and Strategic Royalty Contracts
The Journal of Industrial Economics, EarlyView.ABSTRACT This paper analyzes optimal licensing contracts when a licensee faces the risk of future infringement claims by unknown patent holders. In a setting where a noncompeting licensor contracts with a monopolistic manufacturer, fixed‐fee licensing is optimal absent such claims.
Jay Pil Choi
wiley +1 more source
Strategic Stake Acquisitions in Rival Firms: Common vs. Cross‐Ownership
The Journal of Industrial Economics, EarlyView.ABSTRACT We study how a blockholder who controls a firm should acquire a minority stake in a rival: directly, creating common ownership, or indirectly through the controlled firm, creating cross‐ownership. Common ownership generates stronger internalization of competitive externalities and allows the blockholder to capture the resulting gains without ...
Vincenzo Denicolò, Fausto Panunzi
wiley +1 more source
Household Nash equilibrium with voluntarily contributed public goods [PDF]
We study noncooperative models with two agents and several voluntarily contributed public goods. We focus on interior equilibria in which neither agent is bound by non negativity constraints, establishing the conditions for existence and uniqueness of ...
Ian Preston, Valérie Lechene
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