Results 151 to 160 of about 1,067,568 (299)

Decentralization of the core through Nash equilibrium [PDF]

open access: yes
We show that in large finite economies, core allocations can be approximately decentralized as Nash (rather than Walras) equilibrium. We argue that this excrcise is an essential complement to asymptotic core equivalence results, because it implies that ...
KOUTSOUGERAS, Leonidas, ZIROS, Nicholas
core  

Optimal Healthcare Contracts: Theory and Empirical Evidence

open access: yesJournal of Economics &Management Strategy, EarlyView.
ABSTRACT In this paper, we investigate the contracts offered by a large healthcare purchaser to health service providers. Contracts are based on the DRG principle that all hospitalizations in a diagnosis group are reimbursed at the same rate. This principle is relaxed in practice, as in several cases, the amount reimbursed within each DRG exhibits ...
Paolo Berta   +2 more
wiley   +1 more source

On the existence of Nash equilibrium in electoral competition [PDF]

open access: yes
This paper generalizes previous existence results on unidimensional electoral competition, by extending the traditional two-party electoral game to the case where parties have mixed motivations, in the sense that they are interested in winning the ...
Alejandro Saporiti
core  

Choosing to Know Less: Strategic Ignorance as a Commitment Device in Vertical Markets with Demand Shocks

open access: yesJournal of Economics &Management Strategy, EarlyView.
ABSTRACT This paper examines how a retailer's strategic decision to remain uninformed about market demand can influence outcomes in vertical markets. Rather than treating information acquisition as a straightforward cost‐benefit calculation, we show that staying deliberately ignorant may serve as a strategic commitment device that softens upstream ...
Peter Habiger, Michael Kopel
wiley   +1 more source

Nash Equilibrium and Mechanism Design [PDF]

open access: yes
Nash, mechanism ...
Eric Maskin
core  

Policy Biases in a Model with Labor‐Market Frictions

open access: yesJournal of Money, Credit and Banking, EarlyView.
Abstract We develop a model with labor‐market matching frictions that is subject to a range of shocks, including shocks to matching efficiency and bargaining power, and use the model to examine how monetary policy should respond to such shocks. We show that optimal monetary policy responds effectively to these shocks, producing economic outcomes that ...
RICHARD DENNIS, TATIANA KIRSANOVA
wiley   +1 more source

Evolution and Correlated Equilibrium [PDF]

open access: yes
We show that a set of outcomes outside the convex hull of Nash equilibria can be asymptotically stable with respect to convex monotonic evolutionary dynamics. Boundedly rational agents receive signals and condition the choice of strategies on the signals.
Lars Koch
core  

Financial Constraints, Wages, and Macroeconomic Implications

open access: yesJournal of Money, Credit and Banking, EarlyView.
Abstract This paper investigates how firm‐level financial constraints affect individual wages and aggregate labor market dynamics during financial recessions. We derive testable predictions from competing theoretical mechanisms and assess them empirically using German administrative worker data matched to firm balance sheets. Embedding these microlevel
HAMZEH ARABZADEH   +2 more
wiley   +1 more source

Nash Demand Game and the Kalai-Smorodinsky Solution [PDF]

open access: yes
We introduce two new variations on the Nash demand game. One, like all known Nash-like demand games so far, has the Nash solution outcome as its equilibrium outcome.
John Boyd, Nejat Anbarci
core  

Capital‐Labour Substitution in Macroeconomics: A Survey of Mechanisms, Dynamics and Policy Insights

open access: yesJournal of Economic Surveys, EarlyView.
ABSTRACT Macroeconomic conclusions often hinge on a single, hard‐to‐pin‐down parameter: the elasticity of substitution between capital and labour, σ. This survey synthesises theory and evidence on how results change once we move beyond the Cobb–Douglas benchmark (σ=1$\sigma = 1$).
Francisco Rebelo, Fernando Del Río
wiley   +1 more source

Home - About - Disclaimer - Privacy