Discovering expert-level Nash equilibrium algorithms with large language models. [PDF]
Li H, Li D, Deng X.
europepmc +1 more source
Feedback Nash Equilibria for Linear Quadratic Descriptor Differential Games [PDF]
In this note we consider the non-cooperative linear feedback Nash quadratic differential game with an infinite planning horizon for descriptor systems of index one. The performance function is assumed to be indefinite.
Salmah, Y., Engwerda, J.C.
core
Strategic Stake Acquisitions in Rival Firms: Common vs. Cross‐Ownership
ABSTRACT We study how a blockholder who controls a firm should acquire a minority stake in a rival: directly, creating common ownership, or indirectly through the controlled firm, creating cross‐ownership. Common ownership generates stronger internalization of competitive externalities and allows the blockholder to capture the resulting gains without ...
Vincenzo Denicolò, Fausto Panunzi
wiley +1 more source
Correction: Nash equilibrium of attack and defense behaviors between predators and prey. [PDF]
PLOS Computational Biology Staff.
europepmc +1 more source
Recency, consistent learning, and Nash equilibrium. [PDF]
Fudenberg D, Levine DK.
europepmc +1 more source
Nash-Type Equilibria Theorems and Competitive Nash-Type Equilibrium Theorems
[[abstract]]In this paper, we consider two types of equilibrium problems. We study the constrained Nash-type equilibrium problems with multivalued payoff functions.
Lin, Lai-Jiu; Shih Feng, Cheng
core
Privatization Under Political Ties
ABSTRACT I study a product differentiation model with endogenous entry where a politically connected public firm competes with a private one. Consumers are heterogeneous in their willingness to pay. I argue that—because of political ties—the public firm may mimic the preferences of the consumer with the median willingness to pay.
Matteo Broso
wiley +1 more source
Nash equilibrium of attack and defense behaviors between predators and prey. [PDF]
Ichijo H, Kawamura Y, Nakamura T.
europepmc +1 more source
On Nash Equilibrium and Evolutionarily Stable States That Are Not Characterised by the Folk Theorem. [PDF]
Li J, Kendall G.
europepmc +1 more source
Including Social Nash Equilibria in Abstract Economies [PDF]
We consider quasi-variational problems (variational problems having constraint sets depending on their own solutions) which appear in concrete economic models such as social and economic networks, financial derivative models, transportation network ...
Jacqueline Morgan, M. Beatrice Lignola
core

